Russian President Vladimir Putin’s initial desire to destroy Ukraine was seeded twenty years ago when he witnessed the Ukrainian people revolt against a tyrannical leadership and decided on a democratic future. Dissent over manipulation of a presidential election in late November 2004 was the actual beginning of the geopolitical spectacle that would grow into the biggest armed conflict in Europe since World War II.
Some political experts viewed Ukraine’s Orange Revolution as a failed insurgence. The uprising rescinded a crooked presidential vote and ushered reformer Viktor Yushchenko into power, but did not produce the sort of political evolution the millions of protesting Ukrainians wanted. Instead Yushchenko’s term was full of internal bickering and attempts to accommodate the demands of his opponents. In 2010 he ended up losing the election to that Orange Revolution scoundrel Viktor Yanukovych.
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Concluding the revolution did not achieve its political goals is fair, although the focus cannot be solely on domestic Ukrainian politics. An accurate assessment of the historic importance of the Orange Revolution requires much wider analysis.
Prior to 2004, Ukraine was heavily influenced by post-Soviet Russia. Polls showed that Vladimir Putin was the most popular politician in Ukraine, even though, Russia and Ukraine were already very different. In Russia, centralized power meant firm authoritarianism. More of a balance of power and influence in Ukraine created subdued authoritarianism.
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Putin’s coercive advancement of Viktor Yanukovich before the 2004 presidential election, and his later drive for repression of protesters during the Orange Revolution underlined the growing disparity between the two countries. This accelerated Ukraine’s course away from Russia, a trend which continues today.
Putin played a vital role in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, directly and indirectly. Russian television, widely viewed in Ukraine at the time, repeatedly pressed Viktor Yanukovych’s candidacy leading up to Ukraine’s presidential election. In late October 2004, Putin involved himself directly by traveling to Kyiv where he was honored with a military parade and then made a national television appearance to preach the importance of his choice for president to the Ukrainian voters.
Shortly thereafter Putin’s direct intervention proved to be disastrous. His brazen unrepentant effort to interfere in Ukraine’s domestic affairs was perceived as a grievous insult and an example of his disdain for Ukraine’s independence. This sparked public opinion and helped mobilize millions of nonpartisan Ukrainians.
Several weeks later, following an erroneous second round of voting, the Ukrainian people reacted to the attempted stealing of their election by pouring into Kyiv in vast numbers. It is fair to state that Putin’s act of imperial arrogance contributed to the Orange Revolution.
Over the following twenty years Putin continued attempts to force his will on Ukraine to no avail, essentially pulling the two countries further apart from each other. In 2013 he drove Yanukovych away from European integration in an effort to return Ukraine to the Kremlin’s sphere of influence, which only induced a second revolution and the end of Yanukovych’s rule.
Putin next went down the military route, when in February 2014 his “little green men” seized Crimea, sending Russian forces into the eastern Donbas region a few weeks later. When he eventually realized his military maneuver had only succeeded in fortifying Ukraine’s determination to exit Moscow’s orbit forever, Putin started drawing up the blueprint for his full-scale invasion eight years later.
Ever since November 2004, Putin’s goal of conquering Ukraine has become the fanatical goal of his reign. In his unwavering chase of this quest, he has shown he will spare no expense. The lives of innumerable Russian soldiers killed or wounded fighting in Ukraine, Russia’s economic welfare along with the Kremlin’s international status and its connection to the developed world have all been sacrificed on the altar of his obsession.
The notable change in Putin’s perspective was seen soon after the Orange Revolution. Shortly after the Ukrainian revolt, he ordered the development of what came to pass as Moscow’s flagship RT English-language media platform. This was the starting point of Russia establishing itself as the uncontested global leader in the circulation of anti-Western disinformation.
The explanation for Putin’s obsession with Ukraine and why the country’s Orange Revolution sparked him to such an extent lies in Putin’s comprehension of Russia’s identity and his initial political exposure as a KGB officer in Eastern Europe when the Soviet Empire collapsed.
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, Putin was in East Germany. He witnessed the Soviet presence crumble everywhere amid a surge in pro-democracy activities. In his personal accounts of this time, Putin has said his bosses told him, “Moscow is silent.” This experience has cursed Putin, and he has resolved that Moscow can never be “silent” again, most notably when faced with protest movements or endeavors to elude Kremlin control.
Putin is especially responsive to modern Ukraine’s national energizing and its acceptance of European democracy because he looks at Ukraine as a part of Russia. A democratic political culture growing in an area as central to Russian identity as Ukraine could be a serious threat and an impetus for the same demands within other parts of Russia.
Putin began to show his hostility toward Ukraine’s independence right after the Orange Revolution. He had Ukraine in his thoughts when he stated in April 2005that the fall of the USSR was “the greatest political catastrophe of the twentieth century.” His speech spoke of an “epidemic of disintegration,” and he lamented over the destiny of “tens of millions of countrymen” who ended up beyond the borders of Russia in 1991. At that time, Ukraine was home to the largest number of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet Union.
Not much has changed in the past twenty years. The invasion of Ukraine is an aftermath of Putin’s strong belief that the loss of Ukraine poses an empirical threat to Russia. Thus, it is incomprehensible to think that any sort of specific territorial compromise could end the current war and give rise to a tenable peace. Any bid offering concessions will only bring about a temporary respite before Putin reverts to his game plan of militarily annihilating Ukraine’s statehood.
Putin’s attempts to regain dominance over Ukraine go back to the 2004 Orange Revolution. They have spiraled from political intrusion to the most brutal inhumane European war in the last 75 years. His historic mission, as he sees it, is to destroy the Ukrainian state. He has convinced himself Russia’s destiny hangs in the balance. In this situation, any compromising with Moscow is pointless. There can only be peace if Putin can be assured that Ukraine’s independence is permanent.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.
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