The situation in Syria was among the many subjects that Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed during his marathon press conference on Dec. 19. In answer to questions from Keir Simmons of NBC News, Putin denied that what happened in Syria was a defeat for Russia. Instead, he portrayed it as being something of a success.
Putin stated, “We came to Syria ten years ago to prevent the creation of a terrorist enclave there,” and that, “We have achieved that goal, by and large.”
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According to Putin, “the groups that were fighting against the Assad regime … back then have undergone internal changes,” and thus, “It is not surprising that many European countries and the United States are trying to develop relations with them now. Would they be doing this if they were terrorist organizations?” What is interesting is that the fact that Western governments are talking to the victorious forces in Syria is portrayed by Putin as proof that they are no longer terrorists.
Putin then said, “This means that they have changed, doesn’t it? So, our goal has been achieved, to a certain degree.” Putin, then, seems to be taking credit for having changed these groups. But how? Perhaps Russia’s having bombed them previously somehow turned them into moderates.
Putin went on to deny that Russia had deployed “any ground forces in Syria; they simply were not present there.” The Russian presence, he said, “consisted solely of two bases: an air base and a naval base.” He stated that “there is no secret” that the Syrian armed forces were aided by “certain pro-Iranian combat units.” He did admit, though, that Russian special operations forces had been deployed to Syria, but he said they were withdrawn and did not engage in combat.
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Putin went on to describe the downfall of the Assad regime as occurring when a large number of Syrian troops and pro-Iranian units withdrew in the face of advances by small numbers of “militants.” Russia’s involvement in this situation, though, was only helpful. Just as Russia had earlier helped transport Iranian units to Syria, “We facilitated the relocation of 4,000 Iranian fighters to Tehran from the Khmeimim air base.”
Putin then went on to express his “hope for peace and stability to be restored” and note that “We maintain dialogue with all groups controlling the situation there and with all regional countries.”
This all sounded sensible. But then Putin made an extraordinary claim: “An overwhelming majority of them have expressed interest in retaining our military bases in Syria.” What this means is that even though Russia has been bombing Assad’s opposition for years, Russia wants to keep the bases it used for doing so. This would have been similar to how after the downfall of Saigon, the US then asked the Vietnamese communists if the US could keep its base at Cam Ranh Bay.
Putin, though, noted that Russia retaining the bases was not completely certain. He said that “our interests must align. Should we remain, we must act in the interests of the host nation.”
“What will those interests entail? What can we do for them?” Putin asked. He then noted that “we suggested employing the Khmeimim air base for the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria, and this was met with understanding and a willingness to collaborate. The same applies to the Tartus naval base.”
Clearly, then, Putin wants to keep Russia’s naval and air bases in Syria, and thinks that Syria’s new rulers may be persuaded to agree. Humanitarian aid, though, doesn’t require military bases to deliver. Moscow can ship aid by air to Damascus or other regular airports in Syria and by sea to Syria’s existing ports.
Presumably, Putin wants to retain its bases in Syria to serve Russia’s (or at least Putin’s) geopolitical interests in the Mediterranean and Africa. And since he thinks primarily in geopolitical terms, he must assume that Syria’s new rulers do, too and that their main reason for allowing Russia to keep its Syrian bases would be to serve their geopolitical interests.
What might these be? Perhaps after receiving Turkish assistance in their victory over Assad, the new rulers want to prevent Turkiye from exercising too much influence in Syria by allowing Russia to stay. In international relations, ingratitude is not unknown.
Or perhaps they see a continued Russian presence as helping to contain Israel, whose seizure of Syrian territory and bombing of Syrian targets has not exactly indicated a desire to extend a hand of friendship to post-Assad Syria.
Or perhaps Putin is simply trying to differentiate Russia from the US. Washington has maintained about a thousand troops inside Syria for years since its campaign against Daesh (ISIS) fighters there began in 2014. The US never asked the Assad regime for permission to station them inside Syria. Recently, the Biden administration doubled the US troop presence in Syria to 2,000 – again without asking permission to do so.
If Syria’s new rulers call for US forces to leave Syria but they do not, it would not be surprising if the new Syrian government asks Russia to keep its bases as a counter to the American presence. If President-elect Donald Trump, though, follows through on his call for the US to not be involved in Syria, this motivation might not arise.
Putin, of course, would like to keep Russia’s bases in Syria whether US forces stay or go. Reports, though, that Russia is moving military equipment from Syria to eastern Libya suggest that Moscow may not be counting on this. Neither the US nor Israel should help Putin out by providing the new Syrian government with a motive to allow him to keep his bases in Syria.
Mark N. Katz is professor emeritus at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, a global fellow at the Wilson Center, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
The views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily of Kyiv Post.
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