Georgia’s ruling party has adopted increasingly hostile rhetoric against the EU and the West as it seeks to clamp down on the opposition. Pro-Kremlin outlets in the country have readily aligned with government rhetoric ahead of the elections.
In recent years, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party’s pro-EU stance has sharply declined, signalling a growing rift between Georgia’s leadership and the country’s Western allies. Following its refusal to join EU sanctions on Russia after its unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the GD leadership began to subtly distance itself from its previous pro-EU agenda, despite publicly claiming otherwise. Since then, GD’s rhetoric has shifted to more explicit and open accusations against the West – particularly the US and the EU. This article retraces the evolution of this shift and highlights increasing alignment with pro-Kremlin disinformation narratives and information manipulation.
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Applying for membership
Paradoxically, GD’s shift away from its pro-EU stance intensified when Georgia applied for EU membership alongside Ukraine and Moldova in March 2022. While the GD leaders felt strongly that Georgia deserved candidate status, the European Commission’s Opinion led instead to Georgia being granted a ‘European perspective(opens in a new tab)’ on 23 June 2022, with twelve priorities to address before advancing on the accession path.
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Already looking for a scapegoat, GD pre-emptively cast doubt on the outcome by promoting various false narratives and conspiracy theories. These included allegations that opposition figures and civil society organisations were actively campaigning against Georgia’s EU candidacy(opens in a new tab), along with statements asserting that Georgia was better prepared to join the EU than Ukraine and Moldova, positioning Georgia as more deserving of candidacy(opens in a new tab). GD officials also frontally targeted certain European officials and institutions. For instance, the European People’s Party (EPP) was accused of obstructing Georgia’s EU integration(opens in a new tab). Several members of the European Parliament were singled out(opens in a new tab) for their critical stance, facing accusations of ‘attacking the government elected by the people’ and ‘aggressively interfering’ in Georgia’s internal matters.
In the lead-up to the European Council’s decision to grant Georgia a European perspective, GD leaders sought to downplay the significance of candidate status, framing it as important yet ultimately symbolic. Then-Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili even sought to exert pressure on the EU, vowing(opens in a new tab) to ‘lift the curtain on everything and tell everything to our people’ if the EU decision on Georgia’s candidate status would be ‘unfair’ and ‘offensive to our country and people’.
Following the European Council’s decision, GD officials further escalated their anti-EU rhetoric, fully embracing the narrative – already present earlier – that Georgia’s European integration would come at the cost of imposing sanctions on Russia(opens in a new tab) and entering the war. They argued that Georgia was being ‘punished(opens in a new tab)’ for not complying with Western demands(opens in a new tab) to confront Russia militarily.
Georgian Dream split
Soon after the EU granted Georgia a ‘European perspective’ rather than candidate status, several Georgian Dream members of the Parliament left the party, claiming(opens in a new tab) they wanted to ‘more openly inform the public’ on what was really behind the EU’s decision. These MPs began actively campaigning against the EU and the US, promoting anti-Western narratives(opens in a new tab) that suggested Georgia would not receive candidate status unless it engaged in the war or imposed sanctions on Russia. These MPs formed a public movement, People’s Power, claiming to ‘defend(opens in a new tab)’ the reputation of Western institutions in Georgia by exposing the real power structures controlling them.
In practice, however, they openly criticised(opens in a new tab) the US and EU(opens in a new tab), targeting their representations in Georgia, along with European and American officials(opens in a new tab). For example, after the US embassy criticised(opens in a new tab) the Surveillance Law, People’s Power accused(opens in a new tab) the embassy of using its ‘agents’ in the country to incite unrest, deepen polarisation, and push for a change in government that would open a second front against Russia. Although People’s Power was especially vocal against the US, it also frequently targeted EU institutions, particularly in response to EU criticism of the Georgian government’s actions. Essentially, People’s Power served to criticise Georgia’s Western partners while allowing the ruling GD to maintain its seemingly pro-Western and pro-European rhetoric.
The foreign agents law
In 2023, People’s Power initiated(opens in a new tab) a draft law on ‘foreign agents’ targeting civil society organisations (CSOs) in Georgia and resembling similar legislation already in use in Russia. Despite widespread local and international criticism, along with a large wave of public protests, the ruling party promoted the bill(opens in a new tab), highlighting its supposed benefits(opens in a new tab).
This legislative push was accompanied by a campaign of falsehoods about civil society and media organisations in Georgia, especially those calling out the government’s shortcomings. Accusations also extended to the West. In response to the criticism of the foreign agents law, a People’s Power representative accused(opens in a new tab) Western allies of ‘secretly occupying Georgia’.
Although in 2023 the Georgian Parliament dropped the foreign agents bill in its second reading after widespread public outcry and mass protests, the verbal attacks(opens in a new tab) on CSOs, government watchdogs, fact-checkers, investigative journalists and other government critics persisted. Irakli Kobakhidze, the GD leader at the time, disparaged the protests against the law, claiming(opens in a new tab) the rallies followed the ‘liberal fascism’ ideology. Later, the People’s Power movement echoed these statements, even labelling(opens in a new tab) [unarchived link] the West as the ‘Global War Party’ and accusing it of financing ‘liberal fascism’ in Georgia through various official US and EU institutions.
Candidate status redux
The GD’s propaganda narrative that Georgia was far ahead of Ukraine and Moldova and deserved EU candidacy more than they did intensified in 2023, as the next decision point on Georgia’s EU candidacy drew near. GD officials now consistently blamed the EU for various injustices, claiming that the membership process was not merit-based and that the EU had double standards. For example, then-Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili, stated(opens in a new tab) that the EU would make a mistake by denying Georgia candidate status, while then-GD Chair Kobakhidze claimed(opens in a new tab) that a negative decision would deepen polarisation in the country.
Additional GD narratives pre-emptively blamed the ‘Global War Party’. While the Georgian government asserted that it had been addressing the 12 priorities outlined by the European Commission, the GD continued suggesting(opens in a new tab) that the ‘Global War Party’ might still seek to prevent Georgia from receiving candidate status, thereby attempting to deflect responsibility for any potential negative outcomes for the country.
As GD sought pre-emptive excuses, the authorities escalated their rhetoric, with the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG) issuing a statement(opens in a new tab) blaming a ‘certain group of people, both inside and outside of Georgia’, for allegedly conspiring to incite destabilisation and civil unrest with the ultimate goal of ‘forcibly overthrowing the government’. The SSSG specifically noted that this plot would be activated in conjunction with the decision on Georgia’s EU candidacy and claimed that its execution was being coordinated and financially supported by ‘foreign countries’.
Shortly thereafter, the SSSG released another statement(opens in a new tab) revealing additional details about the purported conspiracy. The SSSG alleged that three Serbian trainers, brought to Georgia as part of a USAID-funded programme, were actively recruiting and training activists to orchestrate the violent overthrow of the government. They emphasized that these trainers were connected to CANVAS (Centre for Applied Non-Violent Actions and Strategies), reiterating previous claims(opens in a new tab) that CANVAS was preparing youth groups for a ‘revolutionary scenario’, allegedly scheduled to unfold between October and December 2023.
These ‘revelations’ from the SSSG prompted reactions from the GD, whose leadership reinforced(opens in a new tab) the assertions. An event organised by (online outlet) Indigo and supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung led members of the ruling party to claim(opens in a new tab) that civil society organisations funded by the West were planning ‘revolutionary processes’ in Georgia, and that these actors had prevented the adoption of the foreign agents law in March 2023 in order to conceal their plans(opens in a new tab). The West was accused(opens in a new tab) of funding radicalism and a revolutionary agenda.
However, even after the EU granted Georgia candidate status in December 2023, the GD persisted in its anti-Western and anti-EU rhetoric.
Foreign agents 2.0
Despite significant criticism in 2023 over the draft foreign agents bill, and against its own promises not to revive it, the GD reintroduced the law in April 2024, accompanied by a statement(opens in a new tab) fiercely attacking Georgian CSOs, accusing them of seeking regime change and dragging the country into a war with Russia, and demanding greater transparency of their foreign funding. The GD also blamed the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) for allegedly meddling in the 2024 elections.
The bill’s reintroduction sparked heightened local and international criticism(opens in a new tab), while Kremlin-backed support bolstered(opens in a new tab) the GD’s stance. Anti-Western rhetoric from GD officials grew, with figures such as former Prime Minister of Georgia and multibillionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili accusing(opens in a new tab) a so-called Western ‘Global War Party’ of meddling in Georgia’s affairs and seeking to undermine Georgia’s sovereignty with the help of CSOs. In response to protests against the law, GD staged a pro-government rally where Ivanishvili accused(opens in a new tab) the West of treating Georgia and Ukraine as ‘cannon fodder’ and blamed Western intelligence for interference in Georgian politics.
GD officials also dismissed the European Parliament resolution condemning the law, with Speaker Shalva Papuashvili calling it meaningless(opens in a new tab) and insulting, then echoed(opens in a new tab) by PM Irakli Kobakhidze and other GD leaders. GD Secretary General Kakha Kaladze labelled(opens in a new tab) it ‘shameful waste paper’, while Vice PM Tea Tsulukiani suggested it was intended to punish Georgia(opens in a new tab) for its independence.
After a letter from prominent MEPs urged EU High Representative Josep Borrell to consider suspending Georgia’s EU candidate status(opens in a new tab) because of the violent suppression of protests against the foreign agents law, GD leaders attacked the credibility of the MEPs involved. Speaker Papuashvili claimed(opens in a new tab) there was no risk of suspension, casting doubt on the MEPs’ intentions and calling them(opens in a new tab) supporters of the United National Movement (UNM), while Maka Bochorishvili accused(opens in a new tab) the MEPs of trying to incite protests.
Ruling party representatives and their affiliates also slandered(opens in a new tab) various European officials following their participation(opens in a new tab) in a protest rally against the law in Tbilisi. They denounced their attendance at the protest(opens in a new tab) as unacceptable interference(opens in a new tab) supporting the opposition. Some described the presence of EU diplomats and other politicians at the protest as yet more proof of outside involvement(opens in a new tab) in a ‘revolution’, and gross interference(opens in a new tab) in the internal affairs(opens in a new tab) of the country, serving the process of ‘Maidanization(opens in a new tab)’ and aiming to strengthen ‘domestic radical opposition(opens in a new tab)’. Other narratives framed(opens in a new tab) the European officials as agents of the ‘Global War Party’.
A key propaganda narrative(opens in a new tab) used by the ruling party and its allies around the adoption of the controversial foreign agents law accused(opens in a new tab) the EU and other Western countries of double standards(opens in a new tab) since they allegedly had similar laws, or were in the process of adopting them. GD officials also criticised the EU’s decision to put on hold part of the military aid to Georgia, casting it as both harmful(opens in a new tab) to Western interests and a political move(opens in a new tab) aimed at undermining the Georgian government.
The 2024 elections
Despite claims from GD officials that the government has never spread disinformation against the EU or the US nor blamed them for trying to open a second front(opens in a new tab), a general election scheduled for 26 October 2024 fuelled a further increase of persistent anti-Western rhetoric from the GD.
GD founder Bidzina Ivanishvili launched the campaign with renewed warnings(opens in a new tab) and scaremongering about the so-called ‘Global War Party’, a force supposedly working to drag Georgia into a war with Russia. He identified opposition groups, particularly the UNM, and CSOs as agents of this alleged force, claiming that they acted under the influence of foreign interests determined to create unrest and bring the UNM back to power. Ivanishvili characterised(opens in a new tab) the upcoming elections as a ‘referendum’ on peace versus war, positioning Georgian Dream as the only true guarantor of peace, while branding(opens in a new tab) opposition parties as facilitators of external agendas. In his speeches, he pledged(opens in a new tab) that GD would defeat these ‘war’ forces, which, he alleged, have been aiming to provoke conflict in Georgia for years. Ivanishvili emphasised(opens in a new tab) that the ‘Global War Party’ wielded significant influence over the American and European bureaucracies and was working against Georgia’s national interests under the guise of the EU and US.
Despite the hostile rhetoric, Ivanishvili was in fact trying to tread a fine line: he suggested that the GD was determined to protect the reputation of Georgia’s Western allies while parts of the US and the EU administrations were seeking regime change in the country. Rather than directly blaming the EU and the US, he placed the responsibility(opens in a new tab) on the so-called ‘Global War Party’ controlling the administrations.
Anti-Western messaging(opens in a new tab) has become a core tactic(opens in a new tab) for GD and its affiliates from People’s Power, with leaders repeatedly accusing(opens in a new tab) Western allies of meddling in Georgia’s internal affairs. Party figures suggest(opens in a new tab)ed that foreign actors intended to influence(opens in a new tab) the electoral process, fund the opposition campaign(opens in a new tab) through illicit means, plan to delegitimise(opens in a new tab) the election results and attempt to orchestrate a coup(opens in a new tab) to install a compliant government that would support military confrontation with Russia. In a stark appeal(opens in a new tab) to voters, GD framed(opens in a new tab) the election as a choice(opens in a new tab) between peace and war, “liberal fascism” and traditional values(opens in a new tab), national independence and foreign control(opens in a new tab) and between Georgia’s dark past and a bright European future. The party implied(opens in a new tab) that a GD loss would hand Georgia over to foreign powers(opens in a new tab), resulting in war.
Since the start of the election campaign, GD officials have also ramped up efforts(opens in a new tab) to discredit international organisations and election observers(opens in a new tab), accusing them of backing the opposition(opens in a new tab) and interfering in the election. Pro-Kremlin outlets exploit GD’s shifting rhetoric.
Georgian Dream’s gradual departure from its pro-EU stance and its shift in tone toward the EU provided a solid foundation for pro-Kremlin voices in Georgia to promote their agenda. Pro-Kremlin outlets and actors have been particularly active in stirring anti-EU sentiment and propagating anti-EU messages around major events such as EU decisions concerning Georgia’s EU integration process.
A delayed candidate status
Since Georgia’s EU membership application, pro-Kremlin sources have consistently sought to undermine the country’s European integration, casting doubt on Georgia’s membership prospects, disparaging candidate status, and targeting EU officials and MEPs critical of GD’s actions.
One of the most common pro-Kremlin themes, especially before Georgia was granted candidate status, sought(opens in a new tab) to downplay(opens in a new tab) its importance(opens in a new tab), claiming(opens in a new tab) it was merely symbolic(opens in a new tab) and offered(opens in a new tab) no substantial benefits for Georgia. Some narratives argued(opens in a new tab) that candidacy would impose new burdens and commitments(opens in a new tab) on Georgia without reciprocal benefits from the EU.
In addition, pro-Kremlin sources also promoted(opens in a new tab) fears(opens in a new tab) that the EU would never accept(opens in a new tab) Georgia as a member state. Various openly pro-Kremlin actors also pushed(opens in a new tab) the notion that EU membership would require(opens in a new tab) Georgia to legalise ‘gay marriage’, and more broadly that membership would(opens in a new tab) mean(opens in a new tab) a rejection of Georgian identity(opens in a new tab), traditional values, and Orthodoxy, framing(opens in a new tab) the pursuit of EU integration as an act of betrayal of ‘true Georgianness’.
Following the EU’s decision in June 2022 to grant Georgia a European perspective (and not EU candidacy), some pro-Kremlin sources accused(opens in a new tab) the opposition of working against Georgia’s candidate status for their own interests, portraying(opens in a new tab) this as a reason for the EU’s decision. They even speculated(opens in a new tab) that the opposition was aiming to incite a Maidan-like movement in the country. The EU’s decision sparked a fresh wave of anti-EU rhetoric from pro-Kremlin sources, echoing key propaganda claims previously voiced by the ruling GD party.
As early as 2022, pro-Kremlin sources vigorously promoted(opens in a new tab) the idea(opens in a new tab) that various foreign and internal forces were pressuring(opens in a new tab) Georgia to open a ‘second front’ against Russia. These narratives claimed(opens in a new tab) that the West viewed Georgia as a strategic tool to confront Russia and to serve(opens in a new tab) US and European interests. Allegedly, the US seeks to keep a perpetual hotspot on Russia’s southern border. Similar claims tied to Georgia’s pending EU candidate status suggested(opens in a new tab) that while the West might not(opens in a new tab) explicitly call for war, it implied(opens in a new tab) that opening a second front could be necessary to secure EU candidacy. Other narratives asserted(opens in a new tab) that Western financial support primarily funded protests and unrest in Georgia, ultimately pushing(opens in a new tab) the country toward conflict and potentially leading(opens in a new tab) it to a fate similar to Ukraine’s.
The foreign agents law
Pro-Kremlin sources strongly backed GD public attacks against CSOs in Georgia following the contentious foreign agents law. They aimed to discredit CSOs, depicting(opens in a new tab) them as tools of Western influence(opens in a new tab). Some argued(opens in a new tab) that CSOs frequently served foreign intelligence agencies, gathering information and working against(opens in a new tab) Georgia’s interests, labelling(opens in a new tab) them as foreign agents who receive financial support in exchange for undermining(opens in a new tab) their own country(opens in a new tab).
Additionally, others asserted(opens in a new tab) that many CSOs pursue(opens in a new tab)d specific party agendas(opens in a new tab), in particular those(opens in a new tab) of the United National Movement (UNM). Notably, certain pro-Kremlin actors advocated(opens in a new tab) for an even stricter version of the foreign agents law, calling(opens in a new tab) for criminal penalties and an outright ban(opens in a new tab) on foreign funding for CSOs and media outlets.
Following a visit to Georgia by High Representative Josep Borrell in September 2023, these sources intensified claims(opens in a new tab) that the US and the EU were actively preparing unrest in Georgia, alleging(opens in a new tab) that the denial of candidate status would be used to incite destabilisation, laying(opens in a new tab) the groundwork for a coup – a ‘colour revolution’ – orchestrated by Western forces. They argued(opens in a new tab) that Borrell’s visit was intended(opens in a new tab) to encourage and rally opposition forces to mobilise for protests later that year.
Candidate status
After Georgia was granted candidate status in December 2023, pro-Kremlin sources in 2024 persisted(opens in a new tab) in their efforts(opens in a new tab) to discredit the EU, framing the candidate status as symbolic only and stirring scepticism about the Union. They revived(opens in a new tab) narratives suggesting that the only tangible result of EU candidacy was increased(opens in a new tab) funding to CSOs that pressured the government, without(opens in a new tab) delivering real benefits to Georgians. They also argued(opens in a new tab) that EU recommendations aimed to bring Georgia under Western control, casting(opens in a new tab) the EU as a ‘fascist’ force(opens in a new tab) opposing(opens in a new tab) God and the Orthodox Church.
Some pro-Kremlin narratives were very critical of GD and the government. Ultra-conservative, far right Alt-Info TV even interpreted(opens in a new tab) Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s trip to Brussels as a sign of a ‘deal’ with the EU, claiming(opens in a new tab) the GD government agreed(opens in a new tab) to soften(opens in a new tab) its anti-EU rhetoric and consider(opens in a new tab) a coalition government aligned with Western interests. In this supposed arrangement, the EU would(opens in a new tab) refrain from targeting Bidzina Ivanishvili, focusing(opens in a new tab) instead(opens in a new tab) on conservative groups in Georgia.
However, GD’s subsequent actions soon prompted a realignment of pro-Kremlin narratives with government rhetoric. First, GD announced a draft constitutional law against ‘LGBTI propaganda’ and then reintroduced the controversial foreign agents bill, albeit under a new name. Pro-Kremlin sources not only praised(opens in a new tab) these moves, but also pledged(opens in a new tab) to defend the ‘anti-LGBTI propaganda’ law, even by force. They also defended(opens in a new tab) the need for ‘transparency’ in foreign funding and promoted(opens in a new tab) the foreign aEXERCgents law as a measure(opens in a new tab) to enhance(opens in a new tab) national sovereignty. They echoed(opens in a new tab) government rhetoric that the law was essential(opens in a new tab) for transparency and rebuked(opens in a new tab) civil society organisations as foreign agents(opens in a new tab) . These narratives also claimed(opens in a new tab) that similar laws existed in Western countries, countering criticism that labelled the bill as ‘Russian-style’. This messaging aligned closely with pro-government rhetoric in Georgia.
The 2024 elections
Ahead of the parliamentary elections of 26 October, pro-Kremlin sources began echoing(opens in a new tab) the ruling party’s rhetoric. They claimed(opens in a new tab) that the West, including the EU, would attempt(opens in a new tab) to delegitimise the elections, framing them as rigged in order to incite(opens in a new tab) revolutionary scenarios and topple(opens in a new tab) the current government. These narratives suggested(opens in a new tab) that Georgia was on the brink(opens in a new tab) of a ‘colour revolution’ similar to Ukraine’s Maidan, asserting(opens in a new tab) that Western policy now sought to destabilise the entire post-Soviet region, including the South Caucasus, by turning it into an anti-Russian front.
According to this narrative, the West aims to(opens in a new tab) replace the Georgian Dream party with a pro-Western elite ready for conflict with Russia, actively supporting anti-government protests and movements through local CSOs and allied groups. Pro-Kremlin sources further claimed(opens in a new tab) that only Russia and Vladimir Putin could prevent this planned coup in Georgia.
These outlets also continued to question Georgia’s EU membership prospects, urging a re-evaluation of the country’s aspirations. They argued(opens in a new tab) that the EU was controlled by the ‘Global War Party’ and the ‘Deep State’, both hostile to Georgia’s national interests, thus making EU membership incompatible with the country’s interests. As part(opens in a new tab) of this narrative, they criticised(opens in a new tab) the constitutional article affirming Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, advocating(opens in a new tab) for its removal(opens in a new tab).
In sum, the information environment in Georgia remains hotly contested, with pro-Kremlin and Georgian Dream discourse converging in their use of increasingly anti-EU / anti-Western disinformation narratives. Don’t be deceived.
Reprinted from https://euvsdisinfo.eu/. You can find the original article here.
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