What Senior Russian Officials Thought Right Before the Full-Scale Invasion

Marko Mihkelson, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Estonian Parliament, built up decades worth of senior contacts during his years working as a journalist in Moscow. Mikhelson provides unprecedented insight about what senior Russian and NATO officials thought would transpire just hours after the full invasion of Ukraine began.

What is something important that you have seen during your current trip to Ukraine?

The Kursk operation that began in early August is proving to everyone that if the Ukrainians were allowed to fight without the restrictions imposed by the West, they could not only stop Russia’s advance but also win this war. When I met with the units fighting on the Kursk front in Sumy during this trip, I clearly sensed a heightened morale compared to the spring (I had previously been in the frontline area in March). Yes, although in other sectors Russia still has the initiative, and in the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk sector Russia has made significant progress, the Kursk operation has nevertheless brought about a turning point. Ukraine is now in a much stronger position to request the necessary military aid and also to dismantle the narrative of Russia’s “new borders”

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Do you think Ukraine will destabilize Russia via the Kursk operation?

Could the Battle of Kursk have a destabilizing effect on Russia? I think not. That is also not the primary goal of the Ukrainians, at least not now. We should not think about or fear what will happen to Russia if it loses the war. On the contrary, that would be the best thing that could happen to Russia. If the endless chain of unpunished violence, terror, and destruction were finally brought to an end, it would be a blessing for Russia’s neighbors, the entire free world, and ultimately for Russia itself. At present, Russia is a zombie society, willing to commit or support the most horrific crimes.

Why are you now in Ukraine?

This was my third trip to Ukraine this year. I helped bring SUVs from Estonia to Ukrainian frontline units (in two years, half a dozen trips to frontline units and more than half a thousand donated SUVs have arrived in Ukraine from Estonia), including those currently fighting in the Kursk sector. I participated as a representative of Estonia in the Ukrainian Independence Day ceremony in Kyiv (for the last four years in a row, I have celebrated Ukraine’s Independence Day in Kyiv) and, together with my NATO Assembly colleagues, visited various frontline units in the Kharkiv region. This is always to better understand the situation, to grasp the needs of Ukraine’s defenders in terms of aid, and to show support for their struggle against a force trying to change the world order.

Before the full-scale invasion, what did you expect to happen when Russia came?

If we recall that in the fall of 2021, a US intelligence analysis suggested that Ukraine’s ability to withstand a full-scale Russian attack would last a maximum of a few weeks, the situation is very good. What was initially thought to be two weeks has now turned into well over two years, and Russia is far from achieving its goal of destroying the Ukrainian state.

So, what is Russia’s central goal in invading Ukraine?

It is crucial for us to understand that Russia’s goal is not only the destruction of the Ukrainian state and people but also the disruption of the current world order. Russia’s dictator, Putin, has repeatedly spoken about this. In October 2023, two days before Hamas’s massacre in Israel, he said in a speech at the Valdai Club: “The Ukraine crisis is not a territorial conflict or a matter of regional geopolitical balance. The issue is much broader and more fundamental: it is about the principles on which the new world order will be based.” Therefore, the West must recognize that Russia’s war in Ukraine is part of a larger Russian effort to reshape the world order influenced by the West, aiming to force authoritarian regimes to make democracies comply with their rules.

Had you been to Ukraine before the full-scale invasion?  

The first time I visited Kyiv as a journalist was already back in 1993. Later, as a politician, I have visited Ukraine many times, especially since the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. When I asked the people on the Maidan in January 2014, braving the freezing cold to defend their rights, why they were there and what they were fighting for, they simply answered: we want the same freedom to decide our future as you Estonians have had.

You were in Moscow right before the war broke out: What transpired?

I was last in Moscow on February 7, 2022, when, at the invitation of the Estonian Embassy, I gave a talk on the evolving international situation to students at MGIMO (Moscow State Institute of International Relations). On the same day, French President Macron was also in Moscow, trying to persuade Putin to abandon his war plans. After the humiliations caused by Covid restrictions, the French left empty-handed. And that was no surprise. The same happened with German Chancellor Scholz, who visited Moscow a few days later.

Did you have any non-official contacts on whom you could call in Moscow for great insight?

From my time as a journalist, I still have several contacts in Moscow, mostly among my former colleagues from various Russian media outlets. Some have left Russia, but most have joined the propaganda army, fueling hatred against Ukraine and the Western world day after day. One of them, with whom I frequently interacted in the 1990s and who is now a regular guest on NTV’s propaganda shows, I met again during my visit to Moscow after many years. Naturally, we also talked about Ukraine and the growing tensions due to the Russian military buildup near Ukraine’s borders. I was genuinely surprised at how, despite being well-informed about international affairs and having traveled extensively, he fed me completely nonsensical propaganda. When I mentioned that Russia was on the verge of attacking Ukraine, he responded by talking about Ukraine’s plans to attack Donbas. He seemed to sincerely believe that Russia was gathering forces solely to defend Donbas. Similarly, both the chairman of the State Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Leonid Slutsky, and the chairman of the Federation Council’s Foreign Affairs Committee, longtime career diplomat and former Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin, gave me the impression of being unaware of the impending invasion. I told them at the time that if Russia were to attack Ukraine, all our relations would be severed. Slutsky then tried to convince me that the troops near Ukraine’s borders were only gathered for exercises. Seventeen days later, the full-scale war began.

How do you see Beijing’s actions playing into the Kremlin’s hands?

This would be nothing more than a dream if Russia did not have the support of an even more ambitious China. President Xi Jinping has made it clear that China seeks to change the international status quo by the middle of this century in a way that guarantees the communist superpower the freedom to reshape the world order, taking into account its military and economic power, enhancing it, and using it if necessary.

This is why China finds Russia’s actions in unleashing a chain of wars aimed at dismantling the Western-led world order to be beneficial. In early February 2022, Putin and Xi confirmed in a joint declaration that ‘the new inter-state relations between Russia and China are superior to the political and economic alliances of the Cold War era.’ This set a clear course for opposing the US and the entire Western democratic world.

A year later, on March 22, 2023, as President Xi was leaving the Kremlin after a two-day state visit, he told the Russian president: ‘Now there are changes – the likes of which we haven’t seen for a hundred years – and we are the ones driving these changes together.’

Taking this into account, it is obvious that if the West, and especially Europe, is interested in maintaining its influence in the world, alleviating tensions in the Middle East, and curbing China’s growing geopolitical ambitions, then everything must be done to ensure Ukraine wins against Russia in the war of aggression it started. Only by guaranteeing Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and punishing the crime of aggression, can long-term peace in Europe and greater stability in the world be restored.”

You were a correspondent for Estonia’s largest daily, Postimees, in Moscow from September 1994 until November 1997. During these pivotal years of Russian history, you came up-close with a lot of personages who are now well known, including Chechen leader Dzhokar Dudayev: What was that like?

It was during these years that it became clear that the collapse of the Soviet empire was neither final nor irreversible. I realized this most vividly when I covered the First Chechen War. In February 1995, I had the opportunity, together with my colleague George Shabad, to conduct a lengthy interview with President Dzhokhar Dudayev. This was Dudayev’s first meeting with journalists after retreating from Grozny. The interview, conducted during the night, is etched in my memory as if it happened yesterday. Dudayev was confident, and his measured words reflected the deep life experience of a Soviet army general (before becoming the President of Chechnya, he was the commander of a strategic bomber garrison based in Tartu, Estonia) and the leader of a long-suffering Chechen people. ‘This war will last for 50 years,’ Dudayev said, referring to Russia’s imperial ambitions. He stated that if the Chechens were to lose, Georgia, Crimea, Ukraine, and the Baltic states would be next in line. It was unexpected and seemed unbelievable at the time, but nearly 30 years have passed since that interview, and Russia’s imperial wars have only expanded. Dudayev himself did not live to see victory in the first war, as he was killed in April 1996 in a missile attack aimed at him. Legend has it that a major Western country helped Russia track Dudayev’s satellite communication signal. This is not out of the question, as the fear of Russia’s ‘collapse’ still hinders strategic clarity, even now, when Ukraine so desperately needs assistance in the quantity and quality required to achieve victory.

So, why is Chechnya not free and instead under the iron clamp of current Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov?

Unfortunately, the Chechens broke. Russia skillfully exploited clan rivalries and stifled resistance with corrupt money. The Kadyrov clan took control, and Russia got its way. Already as a politician and a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe delegation, I visited Chechnya again 10 years after the interview with Dudayev. The visit, intended as a Russian propaganda event, aimed to show Western politicians that everything was peaceful and under control in Chechnya. I saw genuine fear in people’s eyes when the conversation turned to the Kadyrov clan. Ramzan Kadyrov, who was still serving as Prime Minister at the time and whom we met during the trip, left the impression of a literally greedy bandit, willing to do anything to secure his power. In one of his residences, a painting of Kadyrov as a gladiator adorned the wall, and in the corner of a large room, a small shark swam in an oval aquarium. I will refrain from adding any further comment.

At the same time, I am convinced that not all Chechens have lost hope for freedom and a new national self-determination. This also applies to many other nations under the yoke of the Russian empire, including the Belarusians. Their fate has been harsh, but the hope for freedom lies in Ukraine's victory over Russia in this war of aggression. For such a free Europe, others besides the Ukrainians must also be ready to fight.

Even back then, did you sense that Moscow was keen for more expansionism across the post-Soviet space?

The interviews I conducted during my years in Moscow with various politicians, representatives of law enforcement agencies, and public figures reinforced my belief that Russia’s imperial aggression had not disappeared and that it was only a matter of time before it manifested itself with full force. On several occasions, I heard threats that if Estonia took even one step towards NATO, Russia would occupy our country and deport the entire population to Siberia so that we would never be able to restore an independent state on our land. I would like to point out that at that time, the general public was not yet aware of Putin’s existence. Only one person among the many I interviewed, Andrei Illarionov, told me in 1996 that Estonia and the other Baltic states must do everything possible to join NATO as quickly as possible. He knew the mindset that prevailed among the Russian elite. Andrei and I remain good friends to this day.

When do you think that Moscow’s desire to rebuild its lost empire began?

I would like to start from a bit further back. Russia has actually been waging wars to restore its empire almost continuously since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia’s military interventions in Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and of course Chechnya, were all driven by a single goal: to try to maintain or restore control over the former empire’s territories. This fight was initiated by Yeltsin and continued by Putin. In 2008, Russia attacked Georgia and occupied one-fifth of its territory. This was done to prevent NATO’s expansion into the South Caucasus and with the later aim of re-establishing political control over Georgia. The latter has largely been successful through flooding the country’s political elite with money.

Since the West responded to the occupation of Georgian territory only with a soft “reset” policy, it was understood in Moscow that the path to further conquests was paved. We must not forget that President Obama’s failure to enforce his red lines in Syria in 2013 reinforced Moscow’s belief that the US was not ready for new interventions in the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. This was followed by the occupation of Crimea in February 2014 and the launch of a special operation to seize Ukraine. When Putin met with Biden in Geneva in June 2021, it became clear to Moscow that the US administration, which was avoiding large-scale wars (a couple of months later, the whole world saw how the US withdrew from Afghanistan), either did not want or could not prevent Russia from conquering Ukraine.

What is the result of the West showing weakness to Russia?

In the case of a fascist Russia that longs to restore its empire, everything is simple – if you show weakness, you will be attacked. And so it was at the end of 2021 and the beginning of 2022. Putin, who yearns to go down in history as a restorer of the empire, likely sensed from his meetings with Biden and other Western leaders that they were not ready to support Ukraine militarily and were willing to accept a new reality, as had happened after the annexation of Crimea and earlier with the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The attack was inevitable because Moscow genuinely believed in Ukraine’s rapid collapse and the West’s helpless spectating. They sensed that Russia was feared.

What happened to change the tide of history in the case of Ukraine?

Ukraine’s ability to quickly organize its defense, mobilize its people for the fight, and win decisive battles near Kyiv convinced them that Russia’s blitzkrieg had failed. Russia simply did not expect that Ukraine would successfully defend, for example, the Hostomel airfield and stop the massive columns advancing on the capital. The Ukrainians had managed to learn from the bad experience of 2014 and, with partial Western assistance, had restored the combat effectiveness of their armed forces. Russia was simply outplayed tactically. However, this did not yet mean victory in the war, only in one battle. But it also convinced the major Western powers that Ukraine could repel Russia’s aggression, which eventually led to the limited provision of military aid.

Some say that “Russia cannot be beat,” I have a feeling you do not agree with this assessment?

I do not agree with the notion that Russia is unbeatable in the war of aggression it initiated. Don’t forget that the Chechens defeated the nuclear power Russia in the first war. In 1996, Russia was forced to withdraw all its federal troops from Chechnya, only to reignite the war in Chechnya three years later under an FSB-led coup, which elevated Putin to the presidency as a war hero.

The Ukrainian army has proven through several successful operations that it can repel the aggressor and liberate occupied territories. The Kyiv, Kharkiv, and now Kursk operations are convincing evidence of this. It is also remarkable what the Ukrainians have achieved in neutralizing the Russian Black Sea Fleet. They could have done so earlier and on a larger scale if they hadn’t been held back.

Do you think that Western leaders remain hesitant to give Ukraine the assistance they need to win?

Unfortunately, in many meetings with our Western allies, I have encountered hesitant attitudes and a lack of strategic vision. I have heard US senators say that Russia cannot be defeated, and top security officials from one of Europe’s most influential countries suggest that the maximum goal should be that Ukraine must not lose. This lack of a strategic goal, or rather its vagueness, coupled with the fear of Russian nuclear blackmail, has created a situation where Russia knows exactly what it wants and is doing. Meanwhile, the West still seems to be at a crossroads, uncertain of which direction to take. If we had a unified and shared stance that Ukraine must win this war and that Russia must unequivocally be defeated in the war of aggression it started, then it would be possible to provide Ukraine with the comprehensive aid and support needed to turn the tide of the war in its favor. If we want lasting peace to be restored in Europe, it cannot happen without Ukraine’s membership in NATO.

Some think that only Putin’s death could end the Putin Regime: Do you think that there are any more possibilities?

What is happening in the Kremlin and around Putin is as secretive as is fitting for any dictatorship. In the end, the details of the power struggles behind the scenes are not important because even Putin’s sudden death would not significantly change the deeply entrenched symbiosis of the secret services, the mafia, and the oligarchic economy that has formed over decades. Russia, as a terrorist state, has destroyed all forces that oppose the current regime, leaving it with no internal capacity to change the situation. The only thing that can cause cracks in Russia is a Ukrainian victory in this war. The Ukrainian flag over Sevastopol would certainly have a sobering effect.

Why do Estonians so closely identify with Ukraine’s plot and support Ukraine in its war against unprovoked, illegal Russian aggression?

Estonia and other NATO Eastern flank countries that share our perspective understand very well what is at stake in Ukraine’s War of Independence. Ukraine’s fate is directly tied to our own. Estonians still remember the Battle of Poltava in 1709 and how events that took place far from us can affect our destiny. The Swedish defeat at Poltava in Ukraine led to our incorporation into the Russian Empire for the next 200 years. Ukraine’s determination in establishing its independence in the fall of 1991 laid the groundwork for the collapse of the entire Soviet Empire and gave us the opportunity to integrate more rapidly into both the European Union and NATO.

Estonia has supported Ukraine’s progress on the path of democratic reforms for many years. The development of Ukraine into a strong democratic republic is perhaps one of the most crucial goals for the current generation of the free world. Ukraine’s success in becoming a member of the European Union and NATO will shape a megatrend in world politics that will determine the strength of the Western world for decades to come. However, Ukraine’s defeat would mean the rapid global decline of Western influence. This would lead to a real confrontation between Russia and NATO countries, as Russia’s goal, as I mentioned earlier, is to destroy the current transatlantic security architecture.

Therefore, it is only natural that the first arms aid shipments from Estonia reached Ukraine even before Russia’s full-scale invasion began. To date, we have provided military and other aid amounting to more than 1.7 percent of our GDP. If the same level of support could be offered by countries like the US, France, the United Kingdom, or Germany, Ukraine would already have the necessary support to secure victory. Estonia has proposed to its allies that military aid to Ukraine should be at least 0.25 percent of each country’s GDP. Our Ministry of Defense’s analysis “Setting Transatlantic Defence up for Success: A Military Strategy for Ukraine’s Victory and Russia’s Defeat” confirms that this would significantly enhance the volume of weaponry and other support needed to defeat the adversary in this ongoing major war.

What is “sauna-diplomacy”? And how are Estonian saunas helping Ukraine’s soldiers?

Our support is multifaceted, ranging from weapon systems to saunas, which are so essential on the front lines. Estonians love saunas. Like the Finns, it’s part of our deeper traditions. We use it even in diplomacy. Our defense forces have built them themselves during overseas missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. A sauna is an excellent stress reliever. The solution sent to Ukraine is not just a simple sauna, but a mobile multi-solution that gives men returning from the front lines the opportunity to get their clothes clean from the mud and refresh their bodies. Upon entering the sauna, the clothes go into the wash, and after the sauna session is over, clean and dry uniforms are already waiting. Ten machines can quickly serve a battalion-sized unit.

Do you think that Ukraine will win? Why?

Ukraine’s victory is inevitable if we wish to preserve the world order that has brought us security and prosperity. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that since the world order is inevitably changing, it is crucial that democracies do not lose influence in shaping the future. It would be unthinkable for us to voluntarily let a fascist dictatorship like Russia decide our fate. Therefore, the conclusion is simple: if we want to prevent a new world war or stop the chain of world-changing wars already underway, we must help Ukraine to victory, bring it into NATO, and then help Belarus and Georgia return to the path of freedom, if their peoples deem it important.