Russia Is Waging War Against the West, but Most People Are in Denial

Even though Russia admits it is fighting a war against the “collective West,” leaders in the West prefer to dismiss such statements rather than muster up the political will to ensure Russia’s defeat.

This is Part 2 of the interview with Dr. Agnieszka Bryc, PhD, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Toruń, Poland. Part 1 can be viewed here.

Michał Kujawski: We would probably agree that this is not a war over territory, but a war to destroy Ukrainian statehood and identity. The topic of peace talks is increasingly appearing in the media, and some commentators argue that Ukraine will have to come to terms with the loss of some territories, which contradicts the actual goal of Russia. Do Western societies understand that this war is not about disputed territories?

Agnieszka Bryc: Poles and other countries on the eastern flank understand this perfectly. This is not a war over territory, nor is it an internal family conflict. Russia is a revisionist state that wants to replace the Western-centric liberal order with a new “concert of powers,” where a tyranny axis would dictate the rules of the game. The Kremlin doesn’t hide it – Putin and his foreign minister have repeatedly announced that the “American century” is ending and a new era of “global majority,” meaning the so-called rest of the world, is beginning. The aggression against Ukraine is therefore not an isolated issue but part of a larger puzzle. Interestingly, the West – except perhaps for the countries on the eastern flank – has systematically ignored a series of warning signals. Putin’s first war, the Second Chechen War. The poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko. The open renunciation of cooperation with the West during the Munich conference. A year later, the war in Georgia. Then the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in the Donbas. And the final round in 2022. The comforting aspect is that it is increasingly accepted that there is no return to the pre-2014 status quo. Russia will not be a partner, not even a difficult partner, but will be a challenge and a threat. It remains to ensure that a secure Europe is a Europe without Russia.

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The word “war” for many people is associated with front lines and kinetic actions, but for many years we have also been experiencing what is known as hybrid warfare. Are we, as Western countries, at war with Russia?

Yes. For many years, Russia has been waging an aggressive war against the West, but most people deny this fact.

Peace requires the will of both sides; conflict only requires one.

Exactly. We cannot pretend that Russia is not waging war against us, our values and the liberal order. Nor should we delude ourselves into thinking that through negotiations, the Kremlin will cease to be a threat and will refrain from neo-imperial aggression.

So, what kind of war are we engaged in with Russia?

War has many domains. In Ukraine, there is, among other things, kinetic warfare, whereas against us, Russia is waging cognitive warfare. Its front is the mind, that is, cognitive aspects. The Russians are very skilled at this because they calibrate their campaigns. Having a good cultural understanding of each target, they tailor their tools. They run different campaigns against Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states and Western European countries. They do not target the right or the left specifically but touch on the sensitive points of each community. Generally, we are on the defensive, and that is very problematic. The one who wins is the one who first imposes the narrative. If we do not move to proactive operations, we will defeat ourselves. This means that Russia won’t have to fire a single bullet because the West will capitulate on its own. To defeat the aggressor, we need to dare to take the initiative, impose the narrative, and engage more actively in the Russian infosphere. Essentially, we need to reach a state where the Kremlin has to put out fires on its own political stage.

What messages does Russia send to societies, the left and the right in its cognitive operations?

The tools used in cognitive operations are somewhat like subliminal advertising – hidden, sneaky and precisely targeted. They generate chaos and disorientation within the country to ultimately destroy citizens’ trust in state institutions and democracy as a system of values. In Poland, for example, three emotions are constantly stoked: anti-government, anti-European, and anti-Ukrainian sentiments. Every Russian diversion, whether it’s a burnt shopping center or a Shahed drone that lands on Polish territory, is immediately reinforced with accusations of total helplessness and calls of “this is not our war!” Adding to this is the fact that the current administration is strongly pro-European and Donald Tusk was one of the EU leaders, which leads to a Polish internal conflict – the same PO-PIS (Civic Platform-Law and Justice) feud, so entrenched and tribal that even Russian trolls don’t have to exert much effort here. After 2022, the Ukrainian sentiment is also being manipulated, with the enemy of both Poland and Ukraine trying to color it with hostility and animosity. This results in a flood of false stories on social media, such as “Ukrainians receive more state aid than Poles,” “Ukrainians are taking jobs from Poles,” or “because of them, it’s impossible to see a doctor.” One of the most ridiculous was: “Ukrainian women are stealing Polish men.”

Russia exploits social moods, political situations and real problems to cause destabilization. Are states countering this effectively enough?

There are campaigns to debunk fake news and expose disinformation.

However, fake news often reaches a larger audience than the campaigns that correct it.

That’s right. Verifying content and conducting informational campaigns are important, but it’s not enough. To effectively defend against Russian cognitive operations, we need to move from defense to offense.

But we are not doing it.

We are not doing that, and it is backfiring. We’re afraid of being accused of interfering in Russia’s internal affairs. That is a mistake. It is the Kremlin that shamelessly meddles in the politics of other countries, organizes political coups (like in Montenegro), conducts aggressive subversion, not to mention its habit of armed attacks on its neighbors. Meanwhile, we – the West – fear offending Putin and pushing him out of his comfort zone. This is not how you hold an aggressive despot to account.

Is the lack of such campaigns due to political decisions or legal restrictions?

It seems to be more about political will. To defeat the Russian aggressor, we don’t need to lower ourselves to Russia’s level. I believe it’s enough to avoid making mistakes. We should abandon the mistake of an incremental approach in military support for Ukraine. We should provide it with every type of weapon needed to take the initiative on the front. And we should grant it full freedom in the right to self-defense, just as Israel deals with Hamas – on the enemy’s territory. Meanwhile, we should send a message to the Kremlin that Putin is no longer a partner, meaning we withdraw recognition of his authority. There are strong legal arguments for this. And finally, if we cannot adopt new sanctions packages, we can at least tighten the enforcement of existing ones and ensure that shadow fleets do not evade sanctions.

In the cognitive dimension, the sky is the limit. We can become active in the infosphere, which not only shapes the worldview of Russians but also reflects their emotions. We have social media and messaging apps at our disposal. However, I don’t see much activity from the West on these platforms. Ukrainian activity is evident, though. Meanwhile, let’s consider how panic-stricken Kremlin propagandists were over the arrest of Pavel Durov. There seem to be more weak points in the seemingly monolithic Russian structure; we just need to not be afraid to exploit them.