OPINION: Kursk's Next Operational Phase

The Ukrainian operation in Kursk is almost one week into execution. Ukrainian government representatives are yet to speak in any great detail about the operation, although President Zelensky did refer to it briefly in his Aug. 10 speech when he noted that:

Today, Commander-in-Chief Syrsky has already reported several times – on the frontline situation and on our actions to push the war out into the aggressor's territory. I thank every unit of our Defense Forces that makes this happen. 

It is apparent that the Ukrainians have committed several brigades, or at least the elements of multiple brigades, to form what appears to be an Operational Maneuver Group.

The concept of an Operational Maneuver Group had its origins in the Second World War German Panzergruppes and Soviet mobile groups. The concept matured during the Cold War, as Operational Maneuver Groups.

These organizations were designed to circumvent NATO tactical nuclear strikes by concentrating combined arms forces forward and – hopefully – achieving surprise against NATO forces.

There are many good references that explore the development of Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups during the Cold War. This declassified CIA study is worth reading, as are many other books, reports and articles.

In its mature conceptual state, an Operational Maneuver Group was designed to be a combined arms formation that was flexible in size and organization, and designed to operate further away from friendly forces from normal Soviet armies. 

Other Topics of Interest

Russia Is at War With the West – What Needs to Be Done

Russia’s war on Ukraine is in reality a war against the West by other means that needs to be ended by resolution and firmness.

It appears that is exactly what this Ukrainian force is doing. As such, for the remainder of this article I will use the term Operational Maneuver Group (Kursk) (OMG-K) for the Ukrainian forces involved in the continuing Battle of Kursk.

The aim of this article is not to discuss Soviet or Ukrainian combined arms doctrine, however. This piece focuses on exploring the options now available to Ukraine as it moves into the second week of OMG-K operations in Kursk, and the considerations and risks involved with each option.

Status of the Battle of Kursk

Because of the lack of official information being released on this operation, data is primarily gained from open sources.  The quality of data is uneven, but there are enough sources who have proved reliable over the past 30 months since the 2022 Russian large-scale invasion that we can draw an outline of the status of the battle.

It appears that the Ukrainian OMG-K has continued to expand its territorial holdings in Kursk oblast. This includes a likely front line that includes Snagost, Malaya Loknia, Cherkasskoe Porechie, and Martynovka. It is a pretty blurry front line – or Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT). As the different maps below demonstrate, keeping an accurate track of OMG-K activities and territorial holdings is a difficult task.

The Ukrainian OMG-K forces appear to still be advancing between established enemy defensive positions, and where necessary, surrounding and destroying / capturing them. Forward detachments are advancing along several axis and are probably well ahead of the FLOT shown in the maps above. Supporing strikes are occuring including the interdiction of Russian reinforcement convoys and the recent strike on a Russian airbase in Lipetsk oblast which destroyed munitions which almost certainly would have been used against the OMG-K troops.

Critical capabilities, such as air defence, electronic warfare, sustainment and repair of battle damaged equipment, appears to be playing an important support role, although the efficiency of these combat support and combat service support capabilities is unknown. How long they can be sustained is also unknown.

The Next Phase: Ukraine’s Options

Like all military operations, this Ukrainian Kursk operation will have been planned as a multiphase operation, including the prelude shaping operations. These shaping operations would have included all of the intelligence collection, force preparation, deception, operational security, logistics and other aspects necessary to prepare the Ukrainian OMG-K for battle.

Other phases of the operation will have been planned, including the ‘break in’ and ‘break through’ battles, ongoing exploitation and consolidation phases. These phases will have a range of forces and support elements applied to each.

But at the same time, minimal and maximalist goals will have been defined, with the potential to adapt operations depending on factors such as the degree of enemy resistance, the rate of advance of the Ukrainian OMG-K, consumption of critical resources (fuel, food, ammunition, etc) and the sustainability of critical enablers such as EW, air defence, logistics, air support, etc.

The Ukrainians’ first phase, the ‘break in’ and ‘break through,’ is complete. They are currently in an ‘exploitation’ phase. Many operations also normally include a ‘limit of exploitation’ which is governed by things like terrain, logistics, posture and reaction of the enemy, as well as the operational and strategic objectives of the operation. As the Russians slowly but surely begin redeploying forces to seal off the breach in their border and attempt to push the Ukrainians back into Ukraine, it is worth pondering the options the Ukrainians might have once they reach their limit of exploitation.

I think they probably have three options. Each will have minor branch plans, as well as opportunities and risks.

Option 1.  Option 1 for the Ukrainian OMG-K is to consolidate on the terrain they have seized so far and then defend it until some form of negotiation takes place. This is the highest risk option because, as the maps show, the Ukrainian dispositions feature multiple small salients which would be easily cut off and destroyed by even a semi-competant Russian commander.

There are some reports of the Ukrainians already digging in but we should not jump to conclusion about this. The doctrine of most Western armies features digging shell scrapes for soldiers whenever there is a halt longer than about six hours in any one location. Soldiers digging in is not indicative, at this stage, of any intention for long term occupation.

This option, once the OMG-K has reached its limit of exploitation, would however demand huge numbers of combat and support troops to defend the seized Russian territory. It would require a significant engineer effort to build minefields and other obstacles, trenchlines and deep bunkers and logistic storage locations. Air defence, EW, air support, medical and sustainment support would require a dedicated task force.

This option is high risk because the sustainment of combat troops in such a large salient would be very difficult, as would the EW and air defence coverage of combat and support forces within it. Ukraine probably does not have the forces for a long term occupation of such a large piece of territory.

The high probably of losing a large number of forces in this scenario also makes it a strategic and political liability. Ukraine would lose battalions and brigades, as well as artillery, EW and air defence it could not afford to lose. This option, should it go bad, would also squander the very positive strategic messaging that has been generated by the Ukrainian surprise attack into Russia.

The objective for this option would be to continue posing a significant risk to Russian sovereignty and critical assets, and constitute a draw for Russian forces from Ukraine. It might also provide Ukraine some leverage if forced into negotiations in the near future. It is questionable whether the downside risks of this option are worth the return however.

Option 2. The second option is for the Ukrainian OMG-K to undertake a partial withdrawal from the territory it has seized, back to ground that is more defensible. This is a medium risk option, with a decreased risk of Option 1. It would rely on the Ukrainians conducting a withdrawal into pre-designated terrain that is easier to defend, requires a smaller quantity of troops to defend, and is able to be supported by fires, logistics and other functions more effectively.

What is the most likely new Ukrainian FLOT in this scenario?

Frankly, that is unclear at this point because: 1. The ultimate limit of exploitation in the operation is yet to be achieved, and 2. a detailed terrain analysis would be required. This is something that military geographic information systems operators excel at, which informs tactical and operational commanders about their options during planning for offensive and defensive operations.

It would require some withdrawals, which can be dangerous to execute if not planned well. However, these are experienced combat troops in the OMG-K. It is a risk but may not be a major one.

This option would also ensure that more troops could be reallocated after the operation to other activities, be they defending in the Donbas or subsequent cross-border attacks into Russia where there is an opportunity to do so.

Option 2 allows Ukraine to maximise the political and strategic benefits of the strategic shock generated by the operations of the OMG-K, while reducing the risks of losing that combat force. It would still require large numbers of combat and support troops to defend the seized Russian territory, and would demand a major engineer effort to build minefields and other obstacles, trenchlines and deep bunkers and logistic storage locations.

The objective for this option would be to humiliate Putin, continue posing a risk to Russian sovereignty, comprise an ongoing draw for Russian forces from Ukraine, and to give Ukraine some leverage if forced into negotiations in the near future. The risks of this opportunity might be worth the potential gains.

Option 3. The third option for Ukraine would be to fully withdraw back to the international border between Russia and Ukraine. This would permit Ukraine to maximise the political and strategic benefits of operation into Russia while preserving a large body of experienced combat troops that might be employed on subsequent offensive operations in 2024 and 2025.

In essence, by choosing this option the Ukrainians would be messaging to the Russian people that “we can invade and hurt your country if we choose, but we have no wish to occupy our neighbours.” The political impact on Putin might be interesting. While the Ukrainian invasion may have proven his point to Russians about the ‘threat from NATO,’ he also appears weak because he was not able to punish those who conducted the operation in Kursk.

Given the behaviour of the US administration and some other nations during the war, this option is one that they might be encouraging upon Ukraine behind the scenes.

The objective for this option would be to preserve Ukrainian combat forces, while sending a strategic message to Ukraine’s supporters that it can go on the offensive and do so in a manner which does pose an existential risk to the ground forces conducting the operation. The humiliation of Putin and his military is also an important goal. Given the preservation of Ukrainian forces under this option, it will probably be the one that gives Zelensky the best domestic political boost and improvement in Ukrainian morale.

You might note that I have not included ‘march on Moscow’ or a ‘march on Kursk’ in these options. The first is just not even close to being an option and is, historically speaking, never a terrific idea. The second could be a very stretchy stretch goal for Ukraine, but given the size and likely sustainability of the OMG-K, is probably not likely except for perhaps a quick drive-by with small ground or aerial recon forces.

That said, I would not put it past Ukraine to generate some kind of small-scale, large-impact activity against the city of Kursk to general fear and a political effect in Russia. This war has been full of surprises. It would be interesting to see an assessment of the strategic ‘pros and cons’ of such an operation.

Russia in the Donbas and beyond. A key objective for this operation is probably to draw Russian forces away from different areas on the front line in Ukraine, principally in the Donbas where their advances in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions are quite perilous for Ukraine. The degree to which the Russian redeploy forces from here, or other locations in Ukraine, will influence which of the three options above are chosen by Ukraine. Russia also has a range of aviation assets, and some other ground forces outside the Ukraine theatre, which it might employ to respond as well. Russia has already been whining about the incursion in the international community, and has been (unsuccessfully) trying to contact the Pentagon to get the Americans to rein in Ukraine.

Russian response to the incursion in Kursk. Clearly, the Russian reaction to the operations of the OMG-K in Kursk itself will influence the decision calculus of the Ukrainians. Thus far, the Russians have demonstrated tactical and operational shock, which has led to a slow tactical response and has allowed the Ukrainians to continue exploiting their breakthrough of the Russian defensive lines. However, as time goes on, the Russians will slowly get their act together and bring more ground and air forces into the fight in Kursk. The political pressure on Putin from Kursk citizens will influence this. The pace and ferocity of this response will influence Ukrainian military and political decision-making about their options once they decide they have reached the limit of exploitation for the Ukrainian forces in Kursk.

Political considerations – Ukraine. This operation is clearly a morale boost for Ukrainian citizens and their armed forces. As one soldier was quoted in The Economist about the Battle of Kursk, “For the first time in a long time we have movement…I felt like a tiger.” Morale is a significant factor in this operation. The first six months of 2024 have probably been the low ebb of the war for Ukraine. The Kursk operation demonstrates that Ukraine sustains the will and capacity to fight back and hurt the Russians. At the same time, casualty numbers (which are yet to be officially reported) do not appear high. The degree to which a bounce in national morale is achieved, while casualties are kept low, will influence President Zelensky and his military advisors in the choice between strategic options.

Political considerations – Strategic. Ukraine will clearly be speaking with its key partners in Washington DC, Brussels, Warsaw and Berlin to not only guage their reactions but to elicit more support. As Zelensky noted in a recent online address: “We look forward with great anticipation to decisions on long-range capabilities – from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France – we look forward to strong decisions that will bring a just peace closer.” But the feedback they receive from their key supporters about the Kursk operation will have an influence on the Ukrainian government’s decision-making about the ultimate end-state of the operation.

Supportability. Every offensive culminates eventually. Culmination is a word that has entered common usage, rather than in strict military circles, in the past couple of years. It is an important concept when considering the operations of Ukrainian forces in Kursk. At some point, the combination of Russian military pressure, and the sustainability of Ukrainian operations, will mean that offensive operations and continued advances are no longer possible. Judging when this might be the case has technical and command inputs.

Which option Ukraine choses will be informed by the above factors, as well as others I probably haven’t considered. From the very start of the Kursk operation, President Zelensky and his advisors will have been using a variety of different inputs to inform this decision.

Each of these factors above might also be used in defining measures of success for the Ukrainian operation in Kursk.  I have written before on the application of measures of success during this war.

Ukraine’s Big Swing: Changing the War’s Status Quo

This Ukrainian operation represents a very significant effort on the part of the Ukrainians to reset the status quo in the war, and change narratives about Ukraine prospects in this war.

It is the kind of strategic risk-taking that I don’t think is well understood in many Western capitals anymore. For nearly two generations now, Western nations have been able to cut military spending. None of them have faced existential threats, even though the War on Terror did require a significant response for more than a decade after 9/11.

The slow decision-making cycles in Western military and political circles, and in military procurement, is indicative of institutions that no longer understand the imperative to act quickly and decisively while taking major risks.

This is not the case for the Ukrainians. They have faced an existential threat since February 2022 (and more broadly, for the entirety of their existence as a people) and have a very different political and military decision-making calculus than those of their supporters. A nation and a people who face an existential risk from their neighbour tend to think differently from those who do not.

As such, Ukraine’s operation in Russia might have surprised most observers of the war, and even the governments of their key supporters. But from Ukraine’s perspective, it appears to be a risk that has considerable up side if the operation succeeds. So far, it appears that taking a risk by not reinforcing their forces in the Donbas and using them in Kursk may be paying off for Ukraine. But, like all wars and military campaigns, predicting the future is impossible.

There are sure to be more surprises ahead.

This analysis was originally posted on Mick Ryan’s Substack and is reprinted here with the author's permission.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.