Part 1 - here.
The topic of peace talks between Ukraine and Russia is increasingly being discussed by the media and politicians.
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Kyiv Post spoke with Daniel Szeligowski, head of the Eastern Program at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, who has direct insight into draft peace agreements discussed in 2022.
In the first part of Kyiv Post’s interview with Szeligowski, Szeligowski discussed the 2022 peace agreements. In this, the second half of the interview, Szeligowski gives his predictions for what an eventual peace deal for Ukraine might look like.
Michał Kujawski: Are you suggesting that Putin hinted at supporting some unspecified plan of Trump's during the SCO meeting in Astana?
Dr. Daniel Szeligowski: In my opinion, there is no specific plan by Trump. There might be a rough outline, an idea of how both sides could be diplomatically coerced or pressured into sitting down at the negotiation table, but it's not a plan to end the war.
Putin believes that Trump will hand Ukraine to him on a silver platter.
Michał Kujawski: Is Putin trying to influence Republican circles in the USA in this way?
Dr. Daniel Szeligowski: Putin believes that Trump will hand Ukraine to him on a silver platter. Therefore, he wants to adopt a wait-and-see position because what’s not politically feasible today may be achievable in six months.
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Michał Kujawski: As we know, the definition of winning and losing is fluid. In the early days, Ukraine's win was maintaining its statehood and defending Kyiv. A few months later, it was reclaiming occupied territories during a dynamically developing counteroffensive that eventually stalled. What realistic conditions could Ukraine negotiate, and when would be a good time for that?
Dr. Daniel Szeligowski: I believe this war will be decided on the battlefield, not at the negotiation table. Even if this war may end through negotiations, it's not necessarily negotiations that will end this war.
Certainly, both sides may eventually be forced into negotiations by Trump. Trump believes that if Russia refuses to talk, he will crush the Russian economy, much like Reagan did with the USSR in the past.
If Ukraine refuses to negotiate, he will suspend weapon supplies and leave it to its fate. However, it’s just the first step – getting both sides to the negotiating table.
There are absolutely no instruments, and Trump doesn't have any, to ensure that the Russians negotiate in good faith. There's no guarantee that any hypothetical agreement won't be broken by Russia in the future. Unfortunately, a ceasefire at this point is seen unfavorably from the Ukrainian perspective because it would allow Russians to catch their breath, rebuild offensive capabilities, and consolidate control over occupied territories.
The West doesn’t want to win this war – it simply doesn’t want Ukraine to fall.
In short, Russians would again be given time to prepare for the next phase of the war, similar to the time we gave them in autumn 2022. Additionally, Ukrainians rightly fear that Western partners might see a ceasefire as a reason to halt further weapon supplies. Therefore, a ceasefire would work against Ukraine's interests, which is why Kyiv opposes it.
Let's be clear – this war is winnable, but there’s a lack of political will among Western countries. The West doesn’t want to win this war – it simply doesn’t want Ukraine to fall.
A significant portion of Western politicians are deeply afraid of internal changes in Russia. A Ukrainian victory could potentially lead to the downfall of Putin’s regime. From the perspective of some Western countries, these changes would be unfavorable.
The breakdown of the Russian state could lead to loss of control over nuclear weapons. At this point, irrational fear took over the minds of Western decision-makers, overshadowing analytical thinking.
Michał Kujawski: On the other hand, many in Central and Eastern European countries would actually wish for the dissolution of Russia.
Dr. Daniel Szeligowski: I wouldn't have much of an issue with that either. However, Western leaders do have a problem with it. In 2022, a few weeks after the invasion began, a senior French diplomat told me that a frozen conflict in Ukraine is manageable, but internal changes in Russia are not. From their perspective, the West has the ability to control and finance a frozen conflict in Ukraine, but internal changes in Russia are unpredictable and many fear such changes.
Michał Kujawski: Russia, under the name of USSR, has already dissolved once. Many countries gained independence, and nothing bad happened – in fact, the West even expanded its influence.
Dr. Daniel Szeligowski: From the perspective of Central and Eastern European countries, it was a positive process, but let's remember that not everyone viewed it so enthusiastically. Just remember President Bush's famous speech in Kyiv. That speech demonstrated that initially our Western partners had more fear than hope regarding those developments.
Michał Kujawski: Russia is using an escalatory language, while the West is employing de-escalatory rhetoric. There was a certain shift on the Western side when the topic of sending Western soldiers to Ukraine emerged in public debate. Perhaps we should consider a change in approach? It wouldn't lead to as significant consequences as the breakup of the Russian Federation.
Dr. Daniel Szeligowski: I believe that we not only need to change our language but also our approach from reactive to proactive. So far, we’ve been only reacting to Russian actions without taking any proactive steps ourselves.
This is because many believe that we are not at war with Russia. This is untrue – we are indeed at war with Russia because Russia is at war with us.
It takes two to tango, but a war can be initiated by the political decision of one side. Russia has made that political decision – therefore, we must adopt a proactive stance, conduct offensive information operations against the Russian regime and Russia, create both internal and external problems for the regime, make Russian resources overstretched, and complicate their lives in various parts of the world.
Russia is already doing it to the West, and instead of merely reacting, the West is surprised that such a situation has arisen.
I believe that unless there’s a real threat to the stability of the Russian regime, Russia won’t change its calculations regarding Ukraine.
For Putin, the priority is the survival of his regime and war is a fundamental element of it. War creates the Russian state and a new social contract is based precisely on it. If there’s a real threat to the Kremlin's power, Putin's calculations towards Ukraine could change. History shows similar examples. We saw France withdraw from Algeria due to the destabilization of the political situation within France and the threat to stability for the government.
The current approach has led Russians to collectively enjoy a lack of accountability.
Merely supporting Ukraine will not suffice. The war needs to be physically brought onto Russian territory and allow Ukraine to attack necessary targets. So far, Ukraine has been doing this to a limited extent mainly using its own means. Ukraine should be able to strike at all strategic targets.
In turn, the West should change its approach toward Russian society. The current approach has led Russians to collectively enjoy a lack of accountability.
Russian society does not take responsibility for the actions of its regime, despite collectively supporting it. I believe that Russian society should be subjected to sanctions, not just the elites. This way, we can destroy the social contract revolving around war and exert pressure to destabilize the system from within.
Many Western politicians believe that this conflict is not their war but an unfortunate accident. They see it as an aberration in what has otherwise been a more or less successful cooperation with Russia over the long term. Ukraine is viewed by them as a problem that needs to be resolved sooner or later so that normal cooperation with Russia can resume.
Michał Kujawski: What are your forecasts for the future?
Dr. Daniel Szeligowski: In my opinion, there will be an attempt at some form of diplomatic resolution to this conflict. We are currently on the eve of talks – both Ukraine and Russia are preparing for negotiations. This is mainly related to the upcoming presidential elections in the USA.
Both sides are building international coalitions that support their visions for ending the war.
The summit in Switzerland and the preceding consultations among national security advisors aimed to form a coalition supporting the Ukrainian vision for ending the war. Regardless of what one might say about President Zelensky’s peace formula, which was hastily drafted and, in my view, clumsy, it includes a clear sequence of events.
First, the withdrawal of Russian troops, followed by peace talks, the end of the war, and finally, security guarantees. It assumes, of course, the restoration of all Ukrainian territory. There’s also a Russian counterproposal, which boils down to what was discussed in Istanbul in 2022, namely, Ukraine's capitulation. There has also been a Chinese-Brazilian proposal – I predict that a new international coalition will gather around it. The essence of this plan will involve Ukrainian territorial concessions to Russia.
In the coming weeks, each side will be assessing their swords, much like they did during the summit in Switzerland. Each will gauge their strength and seek to strengthen their negotiating position on the summer front.
Afterwards, they will await the outcome of the US elections. Both Kyiv and Moscow are aware that after the US elections, pressures will arise to initiate peace talks.
Russia isn’t genuinely interested in negotiations and is only creating the appearance of willingness to talk. It continues to pursue its maximum plan.
Both anticipate that if Donald Trump wins, he will attempt to bring them to the negotiating table. Therefore, each side is already demonstrating to American Republicans their willingness to negotiate and presenting a plan supported by the international community for ending the war.
I still believe that Russia isn’t genuinely interested in negotiations and is only creating the appearance of willingness to talk. It continues to pursue its maximum plan.
Nevertheless, this pretense of willingness to negotiate may be enough for Trump to believe that dialogue with the Russians is possible.
The problem is that every time we sit down with Russia at the negotiating table, Russia has maximalist goals, while the West begins with concessions and self-restraints. This clearly puts the West and Ukraine in a weaker position because it gives Russia an advantage right from the start.
Personally, I don't believe that there can be a diplomatic resolution to the conflict at this moment because the issue is structural. Both sides claim constitutional rights to the same territory, making practical compromise elusive.
Theoretically, joint control or trusteeship of the territory could be considered, but no one is willing to open Pandora's box and agree to border changes by force in Europe, as it would undermine the entire international system, including the UN.
The initial conditions set by Russia are absolutely unacceptable to anyone. I believe that even if peace talks occur, they will not end the war. In my view, the most likely scenario currently is a de facto frozen conflict without a peace agreement.
I dare say that this scenario is better for Ukraine than a frozen war with a formal diplomatic resolution that would require Ukrainian concessions. The experience of the Minsk agreements demonstrates that they tied the hands of Ukrainians but not Russians.
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