On May 11, the Synod of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) convened a Bishops’ Council – which may one day be called historic. The synod condemned the teachings of the so-called “Russky mir” (Russian World).
Specifically, the Decree of the Council stated that the doctrine behind the main propaganda narratives of modern Russia is heretical because it is “based on the heretical principles of ethnophyletism, Manichaeism, and Gnosticism.”
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The Synod of Hierarchs of the OCU prepared a letter to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople with a request to address Kirill Gundyayev, Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), to publicly renounce the false teaching of the Russky mir, as well as to condemn and withdraw the order of the World Russian People’s Council, whose recent document, “The Present and Future of the Russian World,” outlined the Russky mir doctrine.
For a better understanding of the significance of the latest decisions of the governing body of the OCU, it is important to understand the influence of the ROC in Ukraine through its proxy, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP).
Kyiv Post spoke to religious columnist Tetiana Derkach and to Cyril Hovorun, an Orthodox Ukrainian theologian and archimandrite at Sankt Ignatios College in Stockholm, who for 10 years was the private secretary and closest theological counselor to ROC Patriarch Kirill.
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KP: Why is this decision of the Council (recognizing the “Russky mir” ideology as a false teaching) so important?
TD: The ideology of the “Russky mir” is a multifarious phenomenon, and it’s incorrect to consider it just a heresy. But Russian imperial universalist chauvinism coupled with the cult of “holy war” and the preaching of salvation through death in a war of aggression is more than heresy.
For years many churches avoided criticizing the Russky mir’s misanthropic and totalitarian ideologies team. Now there is an opportunity. The OCU made a decision and this is the first step in a big theological discussion about the Russky mir.
Yet for some theologians, the wording set out in the OCU bishop’s decree is still inchoate.
CH: This decision is quite important. It is unlikely to change the attitude toward the Russian Church on the part of other local churches, and it is unlikely to lead to any reactions on their part. However, such a decision will certainly add momentum to the collective pressure on the world’s religious leaders to take a more active position in condemning the contribution to the war of the Moscow Patriarchate and its leader.
KP: Why is the influence of the Russian Church still so significant in Ukraine, with more than 8,000 UOC-MP churches still operating in Ukraine?
TD: There are many reasons why people remain in the UOC-MP. For example, basic emotional attachment to one’s hierarchy, community, established household, social connections. Many believers think that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is not related to the Russian Orthodox Church, and a large part of them are afraid of canonical sanctions from bishops and court battles. Many don’t want to transfer to the OCU under pressure, people are scared of any forced transfer of temples to the OCU. Some people believe that these are just temporary troubles and are patiently waiting them out. But there are also the classic “zhdunі” (those who are waiting), who want to stay loyal to Patriarch Kirill in the hope that Ukraine will be “liberated” by the Russians troops.
CH: I do not think that the Moscow Patriarchate currently has a strong influence on the UOC-MP in general, although it continues to have a certain formal subordination to Moscow. After the conciliar decisions of the UOC-MP in May 2022 [in which the UOC-MP broke away from the ROC], such subordination ceased to be open, it became more hidden. However, contrary to Moscow’s hopes, it is not translated into the loyalty of the whole of this church to Moscow. Of course, there are those loyal to Moscow among hierarchs, priests and believers, but these people are now in the minority. For the majority, violent methods of attempts to subjugate them to the OCU are simply unacceptable. These very methods not only don’t work, but they have the opposite effect.
KP: Why hasn’t the law regarding renaming of religious of organizations UOC-MP worked? [The law on renaming the UOC-MP was adopted on Dec. 20, 2018, and entered into force on Dec. 26 of the same year.]
TD: The law on renaming, in my opinion, is no longer relevant. It didn’t work because the UOC-MP demonstratively blocked it.
CH: In general, this law doesn’t work for the same reasons that most believers and priests of the UOC-MP don’t want to transfer to the OCU.
KP: How do you think Bartholomew will respond to the request of the OCU to demand that Kirill renounce the Russky mir?
TD: I don’t think Patriarch Bartholomew will publicly address Patriarch Kirill with such proposals, although the Christian conscience requires the heads of churches to give their public assessment of the Russky mir, Patriarch Kirill, the Russian Orthodox Church, and Putin.
It is clear to everyone that Patriarch Kirill has passed the point of no return, and there will be no result from Patriarch Bartholomew’s addresses, if any.
Hypothetically, it is possible to hold a Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and raise this issue.
If we are talking about a heresy, it must be diagnosed unanimously.
And the recognition of Patriarch Kirill as a heretic by one local church must be supported by other churches.
CH: I think it’s worth waiting for Bartholomew’s reaction, if any.
KR: If Bartholomew demands that Kirill renounce the Russky mir, what can the Russian Orthodox Church do in response? Could this lead to a schism in Orthodox world?
TD: I still do not see any need for “sparring patriarchs.” In any case, there will be no schism in Orthodoxy. But the divergence of the churches into Greek and Slavic camps will intensify. A schism is a complete rupture of any canonical relationship, and this is unlikely.
CH: I think Patriarch Bartholomew would consider possible reactions on the part of the Moscow Patriarchate. They don’t want a split in the Orthodox world.
But it’s important for the preservation of unity that they not tolerate what contradicts Orthodoxy, in particular the misanthropic Russky mir ideology.
It seems to me that Patriarch Bartholomew is trying to find a balance between one and the other – so that other Orthodox leaders would agree with his position.
Bartholomew, in contrast to the majority heads of Orthodox churches, is unequivocally on Ukraine’s side.
However, although he is also “the first among equals,” he still can’t act isolated from others.
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