Negotiations are unlikely
Discussions on the possibility of peace talks between Ukraine and Russia continue and now some believe that when President-elect Donald Trump takes office, Kyiv would be more willing to seek negotiations with Moscow as Western aid dwindles and Trump’s team speak about a potential peace plan.
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However, despite continuing economic challenges, high casualty rates, and manpower issues, it seems unlikely that either side will seek some form of ceasefire or peaceful resolution, in the first half of 2025. Ukraine is fighting an existential war, with its current leadership unwilling to negotiate with the Kremlin on the basis of ceding its territory. In turn, the Kremlin currently feels it has the upper hand on the battlefield and seeks to maximize its territorial gains as much as possible if the war dynamic continues to favor them in the next months.
Ukraine’s fight for survival
Ukraine sees the current war as an existential threat to its very existence. President Vladimir Putin has constantly reiterated the mantra that the Ukrainian language, culture, Ukraine and its people, do not exist. If Ukraine falls, Moscow would seek to Russify the whole of Ukraine as it has done in the already occupied territories where Ukrainians are exposed to various forms of physical and psychological violence and coercion: the forced acceptance of a Russian passport being one of the least concerns.
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Ukraine’s political leadership is, therefore, unlikely to seek negotiations next year unless the situation becomes extremely critical. In this context, it is noteworthy that President Volodymyr Zelensky having forbade himself from negotiating with Putin back in October 2022, he didn’t rule out the possibility this month.
While maintaining that there would be no trading of Ukraine's sovereignty, security, or future or giving up the right to its entire territory he said there was no possibility of considering negotiations from a weak position. Zelensky also said that the US could not force Kyiv to negotiate because Ukraine proved that “sit down and listen” rhetoric doesn’t work Nevertheless, he did seem to acknowledge that it would be difficult for Russia to be pushed back to the borders of 1991.
All this suggests that while acknowleding Ukraine’s inability to restore its 1991 borders Zelensky is unwilling to start negotiations with Moscow until the situation improves on the ground. It seems highly probable that Ukraine’s leadership will not negotiate but will concentrate on holding off further Russian advances into Ukraine.
It is evident that any ceasefire or peace arrangements would be short-lived as the it seems that Putin still intends to subjugate Ukraine fully one way or the other, i9f not now then sometime in the future.
Another contributing factor is that ending the war will increase the demand for new elections in Ukraine. While Zelensky previously said he wouldn’t run for office for a second time, by 2023 his position seemed to have changed, though it is unclear whether Zelensky could get reelected if such elections occurred anytime soon.
The Kremlin focus is on maximizing territorial gains
Earlier this month, sources within Putin’s circle suggested that Russia doesn’t rule out ending the war along existing front lines but would not discuss any major territorial concessions to Ukraine apart from the small areas it holds in the Kharkiv and Mykolaiv regions.
However, taking into account its recent military advances in eastern Ukraine and its numerical manpower and weaponry advantage it seems improbable that the Kremlin would consider negotiating on that basis in 2025.
Putin made it clear in October 2022 and reiterated it in his June 2024 “peace plan” that his minimum objective was to fully annex the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Luhansk, and Donetsk regions. The whole purpose of the 2022 full-scale invasion was the complete subjugation of Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian puppet regime and many believe that long-term Russian plans have the same objective.
As Kyiv Post reported a week ago Russia’s 20-year plan is to divide Ukraine into three zones: its eastern regions becoming fully Russian-occupied territories; discussing handing parts of western Ukraine to its neighbors Poland, Hungary, and Romania; with the remaining central territories, including Kyiv, being left under the control of a puppet pro-Russian regime to serve as a buffer between the West and Russia.
The current front line dynamics suggest the Kremlin remains focused on seizing as much territory as possible in the four partially annexed regions as a stepping stone to this wider objective. Everything points to Moscow’s intention to conduct its “special military operation” at the same or even more intensive pace.
It is ramping up military production, more actively deploying front line troops, and stepping up military recruitment both at home and supported by its North Korean and Yemeni allies. Regardless of increasingly heavy casualties and expenditure, this situation seems destined to continue at least until mid-2025 unless economic reality and pressure from the US and China to push both parties to the negotiating table.
The fear [or reality] is that if a temporary ceasefire agreement is reached, Putin would use this time to recover and rebuild his military with the aim of resuming his long-term plan to fully subjugate the whole of Ukraine and to install a pro-Russian puppet regime or even fully absorb it within Russia.
The Kremlin invests heavily in national defense
Russia has committed a record $145 billion to his 2025 defense budget, a 25 percent increase on 2024’s allocation which is a new post-Soviet high. It has invested drastically in new types of weaponry, particularly drones while securing additional munitions, missiles, and drones from countries like North Korea and Iran.
Under the latest military agreement concluded with Pyongyang, Russia has received a large number of weapons for the war against Ukraine, including at least 3.5 million 152mm artillery ammunition, as well as missiles to allow Russia to step up its offensive efforts in the east and south of Ukraine next year. This is already evidenced by the Kremlin’s intensification of combined ground and air/drone/rocket attacks across several areas of the front line.
What we might expect in in 2025
The Russian army will aim to increase its offensive efforts in the south and east of Ukraine, using the winter to replenish stocks and renew ground attacks in the spring to seize more territory in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and possibly in Kharkiv regions. At the same time we can also expect more intensified Russian air/rocket/drone attacks aimed at fully paralyzing Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, particularly its energy sector during the coming winter.
Ukraine will focus on preventing Russian forces from advancing in the east and south as Moscow will try to leverage its superiority in manpower and advantage in drones, shells, and rockets to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses and advance further into Ukraine.
These more intensified air and rocket attacks and ground clashes, will result in high casualty rates among combattants, along with more damaged critical infrastructure and increased civilian casualties. While the Russian military is likely to capture the rest of the Donetsk region and slowly advance in the country's south, it will not achieve substantial territorial gains next year due to its inability to maintain such an intensive offensive pace against fierce Ukrainian resistance and inability for the whole year.
In light of potentially dwindling US military aid, Ukraine will have to focus on increasing its own domestic military expenditures at the expense of other spending while also being unable to ensure sufficient mobilization to fill the gaps in critical front-line areas. Ensuring domestic military production and getting what remains of already committed US aid and military aid from EU member states could allow Ukraine to further slow Russian advances in the east and south next year.
It is crucial Ukraine continues to receive external support as fights for its survival and for a future as part of Europe. Its defeat would be a fatal blow to the West and a victory for the hostile and authoritarian Kremlin, which actively seeks to undermine European and global security by any possible means.
The views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.
Maksym Beznosiuk is the UAinFocus Platform director, an independent analytical platform for sharing the opinion of the world’s leading experts on Ukraine.
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