In a 1973 lecture, Sir Michael Howard described the impact of surprise, and the necessity of military institutions to prepare their people to absorb, and adapt around, surprises on the battlefield and beyond. He described how “this is an aspect of military science which needs to be studied above all others in the Armed Forces: the capacity to adapt oneself to the utterly unpredictable, the entirely unknown.”
Sir Lawrence Freedman, has written that, “a surprise attack, conceived with cunning, prepared with duplicity and executed with ruthlessness, provides international history with its most melodramatic moments.” Surprise is an important continuity in human competition and warfare. The desire to surprise an adversary is central to the Eastern and Western traditions of war.
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The aim is to shock an adversary and overwhelm them when they are their weakest or when they least expect it. That shock, and the breakdown in enemy cohesion and ability to effectively respond, can then be used to seize large amounts of ground and destroy significant enemy formations.
It appears that yet again, in the past few days, the Ukrainians have surprised Russia, and observers in the west, with their latest operation.
Over the past 72 hours, we have watched as Ukraine has launched a significant cross-border assault into Russia’s Kursk region. Initially viewed as another raid into Russia, similar to the previous Ukrainian operations in May 2023 and March 2024, it has become clear that this is something slightly different, particularly in its use of conventional Ukrainian ground forces.
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Just how different this new Ukrainian operation is from those previous raids remains to be seen. The following is my quick assessment based on what we have seen so far. I am the first to admit that we are seeing only a small part of this operation at this point.
The 21st Century Battle of Kursk Begins
Despite our ability to only see a small part of what is occurring in Kursk, there are several aspects of this new Ukrainian operation which are apparent.
First, this is a multi-brigade operation. At least two Ukrainian brigades have been identified so far: the 22nd Mechanized Brigade and the 82nd Air Assault Brigade. These are both quality formations. It appears that unlike in the 2023 southern counteroffensive where fresh brigades were employed, the Ukrainians have allocated experienced formations to this attack.
This already appears to be paying dividends with the depth of the Ukrainian penetration so far. But, if we can see two brigades, there may be even more allocated to the operation which are ready to assume the lead on the advance into Russia. However, this will depend on the operation’s objectives and how long Ukraine thinks it can sustain its attack before Russian defenses are able to effectively respond.
Second, the Ukrainians have attacked with a highly mobile, mechanized force. This is different to the Russian dismounted attacks into Kharkiv in recent months. A high level of mobility is essential to creating or exploiting gaps in enemy defenses, and rapidly exploiting such gaps. Speed and shock action are vital. But mechanized operations create a larger logistic liability than dismounted action, and armored vehicles can be harder to hide in open warfare.
And after a few days of constant operations, they also need maintenance. This reinforces the need for second echelon forces to conduct forward passage of lines operations to assume the advance. You can read about this very complex undertaking in a previous article on Passage of Lines here.
Third, the Ukrainians appear to have deployed a significant amount of air defense capability. At least one Russian fighter aircraft and two helicopters have been claimed to have been shot down by the Ukrainians. There have been, as of this point, limited reports of Russia being able to use glide bombs or even large numbers of drones to counter the Ukrainian assault. This is indicative of a more effective air defense environment for the Ukrainians than was created for their 2023 counteroffensives. It is also probably another outcome of the surprise and shock generated in the Russian command and control network by the Ukrainians.
Fourth, the Ukrainians have penetrated a good distance into Russia. The map above (from Black Bird Group) shows the currently estimated penetration of Ukrainian forces in Russia on at least two axes of advance. Main and supporting efforts are unclear.
However, the situation remains very unclear and Ukrainian forces could be much deeper into Russia than shown on the map. The situation will remain dynamic for a while yet. That said, this probably constitutes the biggest advance by any side in this war since late 2022. By comparison, the Russian advance into Kharkiv this year penetrated about 8 kilometers into Ukraine.
Fifth, Ukraine has achieved surprise. This is an important theme to note given the obsession of some with describing this war as a ‘transparent battlefield.’ This, again, shows that the modern battlefield is far from transparent, and that deception activities, good intelligence, and surprise are crucial elements of modern war. More importantly, the Ukrainian cross-border attack shows that surprise is still possible, and that offensive operations are also possible despite the prevalence of the defense in the past year. I will be writing a separate piece on surprise in the coming days.
Ukraine’s Objectives
As with all major operations in war, we need to consider the strategic context and strategic / political intent of such operations. The 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive had both political and strategic objectives. This latest Ukrainian offensive into Kursk will as well. What might they be? The section below is speculative, given that Ukraine is yet to make any substantive, official comment on the offensive yet.
At the most basic tactical level, this operation will be about seizing ground and destroying Russian ground and aerial forces. That is the central role of ground forces in war. But these are tactical tasks – it is the operational and strategic purposes of conducting operations to seize ground and destroy the enemy that is interesting.
There are a couple of possible operational objectives for this Ukrainian attack. First, Ukraine may be seeking to draw Russian forces away from its attacks on the Niu-York and its advances on Toretsk and Pokrovsk. This might be possible, but given Russia’s advantage in manpower, one would have to assess that this outcome is probably unlikely.
Another operational objective, which is more likely to be realized, is to force the Russians to reconsider their force dispositions elsewhere on the front line. The Russians will have to respond, and even they do not have a bottomless pit of resources to do so. To respond to the Ukrainian attack in Kursk, they will have to stop defending somewhere else. Ukrainian surveillance systems will be watching for these kinds of Russian moves and potentially standing by to exploit the opportunities they produce.
Finally, Ukraine may have some specific operational objectives in mind which are related to the ground itself. The Kursk nuclear power station may be one objective, but that is speculative and still lies 60 kilometers (37 miles) from the border with Ukraine, well beyond where Ukraine is currently thought to be operating. Key road and railway lines might also be interrupted. Ultimately, threatening the city of Kursk itself could be an objective for the operation, but that would be a ‘stretch goal’.
The strategic objectives of this attack can only be estimated at this early stage. First, the attack might be an attempt to slow or kill Russian momentum in its offensives which have lasted for the duration of 2024. Ukrainian planners will understand that even Russia can’t remain on the offensive forever. They may be seeking to use this cross-border attack to force the Russians to reassess their troop dispositions across Ukraine. This could have the effect of slowing down or stopping Russian offensive operations.
A second strategic objective might be to shift the narrative on the war to one more positive for Ukraine and counter Russian misinformation about their ‘inevitable victory’ in Ukraine. The 2022 offensive in Kharkiv not only stunned the world but shifted the narrative on Ukraine’s ability to prosecute the war and resulted in a significant change in the west’s approach to providing aid. Ukraine might be hoping for something similar here, although as I have written frequently, NATO also needs to change its strategy to one that embraces Ukraine defeating Russia in Ukraine.
A third strategic objective may be to boost morale in the Ukrainian population. Given the past 8 months of defensive operations, constant aerial attacks on infrastructure and ongoing power shortages, the will of the people will be at the forefront of the Ukrainian government’s considerations about the trajectory of the war. Conducting a successful offensive into Russia, which takes the pressure off in other areas, might be seen by the government as worth the risk of using experienced brigades in this operation rather than in defending in eastern Ukraine.
A fourth strategic objective for Ukraine might be to do what the Russians are doing in eastern Ukraine at the moment – grab as much territory as possible in case Ukraine is forced into some kind of negotiated settlement at the end of 2024 or in early 2025. Negotiating with some of your enemy’s territory is much better than negotiating without it. And while there are many issues related to any kind of ceasefire or negotiated settlement (who will enforce it, for example), Ukrainian strategists might believe that possessing Russian territory will provide them with better leverage if they are forced to the negotiating table in the short to medium term.
Russia’s Response
So far, the Russian system appears to still be suffering the ‘shock’ that has been generated from the Ukrainian cross border attack. The mass of Russian forces, and probably their operational level reserves as well as tactical aviation and operational fires, are concentrated further to the south. While Russia will almost certainly have strategic reserves, and forces in the Kursk and Kharkiv regions it can use to try and halt the Ukrainian advance, this will take some time to organize.
Putin appears to have gotten on the front foot with this Ukrainian attack quicker than other surprises during this war. During the Prigozhin uprising, Putin disappeared for a while. This time, Putin has quickly held a meeting of the National Security Council, some of which was shown on Russian TV, where he described the Ukrainian Kursk operation as “another large-scale provocation.” Because, of course, nothing Russia has done in the past 30 months in its brutal invasion of Ukraine is provocative. Putin will be messaging the U.S. administration here to have them reign in Ukraine.
The Russian assaults in eastern Ukraine, particularly on the Toretsk and Pokrovsk axes of advance do not appear to have been affected yet. The Russians appear to still be very focused on seizing more ground in this region. However, any propaganda coup from such gains has probably already been overtaken by Ukraine’s significant seizures of Russian territory in the Battle of Kursk.
We should expect an accelerating Russian response to the Ukrainian cross border attack. Russia probably has the manpower to respond, but speed will be key to the effectiveness of their response. The centralized nature of the Russian command and control system does hinder their speed and adaptability during crises such as this.
It is very likely that Ukraine will have wargamed Russian responses and will have already allocated strike elements to hit Russian units moving towards Kharkiv (if possible). This is likely to be a multi-phase Ukrainian operation, and planning for likely anticipated Russian moves over the coming days and weeks will have been central to Ukraine’s overall planning for this operation.
Russia’s reaction to the invasion, including troop moves, aerial strikes against Ukraine as well as diplomatic moves, will become clearer in the coming days.
A final point on Russia’s reaction. Will this be the final straw for Gerasimov?
I have written previously about his shortcomings before the war and during the war. He has constantly failed at strategy, force generation and in a range of other strategic leadership areas in this war. In the National Security Council meeting held to discuss the Kursk situation, Gerasimov informed Putin by video that in regard to the Ukrainians, their “advance in the Kursk direction was halted.” While he is loyal to Putin, and this counts for a lot, will Putin finally decide to dump him in the wake of this disaster in Kursk?
Challenges Moving Forward
Ukraine faces a daunting array of issues as it moves forward with this operation (if it continues it beyond a couple of days). These include tactical, operational, strategic and political challenges.
Tactical challenges. A first order tactical challenge will be sustaining momentum. Ukraine will want to keep moving forward until it has achieved its objectives. At the same time, it will want to keep the Russians off balance, and ensure that the Russian army is always a couple of steps behind in responding the Ukrainian actions.
At the same time, Ukraine will want to ensure it can keep the breach open for the advance and for any withdrawal. These kinds of penetrations into enemy territory create opportunities, but they also create vulnerabilities. I have written previously about the challenge of creating salients in enemy territory here. One key vulnerability is the flanks of the advancing Ukrainians. As I wrote in this piece, an important tactical task will be the allocation of security forces to hold open the corridor into Russia that Ukraine has now created. The further Ukraine penetrates, the larger the quantity of forces will be needed for this mission.
Salients create opportunities and problems
Keeping the Ukrainians supplied with fuel, food, munitions and everything an advancing army needs will be challenging. Deep in enemy territory, not only must reliable routes be available, but the logistics convoys need to be protected from ground and air attacks.
Operational Challenges
As Ukraine seizes the initiative in this cross-border assault, they may be considering follow-on operations. These could be reinforcing their current axes of advance to expand the amount of territory held, or they could be operations in an entirely different area to exploit and shifts in Russian defensive troops. But this will be reliant on the amount of forces the Ukrainians have kept in reserve for this offensive, which leads me to the next major challenge.
The Ukrainians will also have to carefully balance the apportionment of air support, munitions, sustainment and other operational enablers between the perilous situation in eastern Ukraine and the new offensive in Kursk. These regions are far enough apart that they cannot be mutually supportive, which will make this a more difficult problem.
This in turn will inform another operational challenge: what is the duration of the cross-border attack, and how long can the offensive be sustained? This will be driven by practical concerns such as logistics and troop availability. But it will also be driven by political influences about how long the Ukrainian government wishes to occupy Russian territory.
Strategic Issues. Troop numbers are a strategic concern. It is no secret that Ukraine has had very significant issues in sustaining numbers in its front-line formations since the end of 2023. And while Ukraine has been able to stay on the positive side of the ratio of Ukraine to Russian casualties, it still has a much smaller pool of troops than Russia. Mobilization is yet to fully replenish Ukrainian losses of the past year. And there remains a compelling requirement for Ukrainian forces to at least slow Russian advances in eastern Ukraine.
Balancing strategic shortfalls for troops, and the need for large numbers of troops on this operation and in eastern Ukraine will require good intelligence and deft decision making over the coming days and weeks. To compound this challenge, if Ukraine intends to stay on the territory it seizes (this is speculation on my part), this will add the major personnel challenges that Ukraine already has.
Another strategic challenge is fitting the current offensive into a larger military strategy for Ukraine. Is this offensive an integral part of the new strategy that President Zelensky tasked General Syrsky to develop when he was appointed? Or is this an opportunity that has arisen and was too tempting to pass up? Time will tell.
Ukraine, while not having made any official statements about the Kursk offensive yet, will be watching its strategic narrative and how this new operation plays out in Europe and the United States. Ukraine will obviously be looking for a bump in positive perceptions about the trajectory of the war, while avoiding any negative connotations associated with ‘invading its neighbor’ which are sure to be raised by some.
Political Challenges. Related to the strategic narrative discussed above will be avoiding perceptions that Ukraine is significantly escalating the war and increasing the change of Russia using nuclear weapons. I expect to hear this narrative in the coming days. It has been a constant refrain in this war, whenever some new piece of equipment, like artillery, tanks and F-16s, is donated to Ukraine. None of these have crossed any real red lines with Russia, although Russia has many western leaders bluffed into thinking so.
This will potentially be a significant political and strategic challenge for the Ukrainian government in the coming days, even though this operation is very minor compared to the major destruction and death caused by Russia in Ukraine over the past 30 months.
Perhaps one of the more difficult political issues will be how Ukraine deals with the US government. Ukraine can’t use some of its American long-range strike systems to support its operations, which is less than desirable. This operation might force the US administration to reconsider the restrictions it has placed on the use of some of its weapons in this war. That might be wishful thinking on my part, however.
The longer the operation continues, the more likely it is that candidates for the Presidency this year may be forced to make statements about their support (or otherwise) for Ukraine.
The New Battle of Kursk Continues… For Now
Time will tell whether using these Ukrainian brigades to attack into Russia rather than defending eastern Ukraine has been the most strategically effective use of their forces. At a time when Ukrainian defenders in the east are being pushed back on several axes, the use of highly capable Ukrainian combat forces in Kursk is either a brilliant countermove to shift the initiative in the war, or a strategic error which compounds the challenges in Ukraine’s eastern Ukraine defensive operations.
There is no way yet to make this assessment, however. As with all war, there is an abundance of uncertainty at the early stage of another Ukrainian offensive. Not only are we unsure about just how far deep the Ukrainians have penetrated, but we are also unsure of the strategic and political objectives of this operation.
While success or failure in this Ukrainian cross-border attack may not win or lose the war, it will have an important bearing on Ukrainian morale and western support. But ultimately, the success or otherwise of the coming offensives will be determined on the ground. Good leadership at all levels, flexible execution, determined close combat, good logistics, surprise and adapting to opportunity will all be crucial to tactical and operational success. And this must be applied with sound strategic reasons.
This all might end up being just a larger scale raid than the previous 2023 and 2024 incursions into Russia. We will know in time.
There is much to be revealed about the nature and objectives of this operation in the coming days.
This analysis was originally posted on Mick Ryan’s Substack and is reprinted here with the author's permission.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.
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