Two weeks ago, Tehran condemned the imposition of Western sanctions on a number of its state-owned shipping entities, citing allegations by the UK and EU member states that it had transferred ballistic missiles to Russia in support of its war in Ukraine as “baseless and fake.”
The US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken first made the allegation on Sept. 9, after which the EU and the UK widened its financial sanctions against Iran, targeting its ports and vessels involved in the transfer of Iranian technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), tactical short-range missiles, long-range projectiles, and their components.
JOIN US ON TELEGRAM
Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official.
As Washington continues to highlight Tehran’s delivery of short-range tactical missiles to Russia, the EU and UK have said this as a direct threat to Europe’s territorial integrity and security, opening the doors for even more severe sanctions which could, according to at least one source, impose stricter aviation restrictions including the sanctioning of Iran’s national airline.
Tehran continues to deny these claims. Its Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, declared these allegations as being “false, emanating from falsified intelligence,” despite this being the second time Iran has been accused of transferring missiles to Russia. In the first half of 2022, the UK highlighted a potential missile transfer to Russia with an international news outlet publishing detailed accusations of such missile transfers in February which was soon followed by other reports picking up on the theme, which Tehran denied outright.
Sanctions Busting: Germany’s Role in Dodging Russian Sanctions
Despite these denials, the evidence is that Iranian military support to Russia has increased considerably since the February 2022 full-scale invasion. In particular, experts from within the Western intelligence community point to the overwhelming evidence of the extensive use of the Iranian Shahed kamikaze drones against Ukrainian infrastructure. These Iranian provided assets have been an essential force multiplier for Moscow’s forces that, without doubt, continue to face serious logistical challenges and remain technologically inferior on the battlefield due to severe international sanctions in its war of attrition.
Western strategic calculus
Despite the evidence pointing strongly towards missile transfers from Iran to Russia substantive verification of the use of such missiles against Ukrainian military or civilian infrastructure has not yet been seen. This was reinforced by President Volodymyr Zelensky’s statement of September 11.
One expert from Tehran suggests that the exhaustive investigations into and reporting of alleged Iranian missile transfers to Russia are part of a wider strategy aimed at preventing Tehran from escalating attacks against the Israeli offensives in Gaza.
A Lebanese scholar hinted that Western intelligence institutions could control the narrative by releasing certain elements of intelligence aimed at eliciting a desired response from a particular audience. According to such a hypothesis, the premature release of such controlled information by Washington and its allies was following a playbook that would build diplomatic pressure on Tehran, as a “warning shot” against going through with the missile deal in the future.
A former political leader still active in Iranian diplomatic circles strongly asserted that no such deal, for either complete missiles, related technology or components, existed between Tehran and Moscow. They categorized Western Intelligence sources as creating a “smoke without fire” scenario.
The authors of this piece have reviewed open-source documents and circumstantial battlefield evidence which they have compared with in-person interviews. They have concluded that the only logical explanation points towards the West’s intent on preventing Tehran from forging more significant military ties with Moscow.
A nuclear play?
Taking this as a meagre hypothesis, if Tehran were to transfer ballistic missile systems/technology to Moscow, what could have possibly motivated the reformist Pezeshkian government to make such a decision? The answer lies not in the background of deepening military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow or in Tehran’s desire to acquire knowledge in air defense and conventional missile systems but, more importantly, in its desire to seek Russia’s assistance to fuel its nuclear ambitions.
The Israeli precision strike on Tehran in the last week of October exposed vulnerabilities in its air defense, for which the IRGC may seek Russian expertise in areas of air defense, and to seek collaboration and joint production of technical hardware. But the principle, strategic factor of military cooperation between the two nations rests on Moscow’s expertise in nuclear technology and its changing stance on nuclear proliferation.
With Tehran already credited as Moscow’s force multiplier, it could invite Russian experts to potentially boost its nuclear ambitions. Over the years, Moscow was credited with influencing Iran’s nuclear programs and even, to an extent, curtailed its progress. Still, this changed relationship may see Tehran using its support for the Kremlin’s “special military operation” as leverage to seek Moscow’s positive support to its nuclear development.
One Tehran-based expert recalled two separate engagements between Iranian political leaders and a scientific delegation from Russia aimed at revising its nuclear policy based on a more flexible approach towards nuclear proliferation by Moscow.
This could certainly mean Moscow’s will have a more relaxed stance on Iran’s weaponization of its nuclear program. While Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s recently elected reformist president, may have expressed a desire to engage in negotiations with the West, Moscow could use this opportunity to silently fuel Iran’s nuclear ambitions, even to the extent of possibly expanding its program.
For Moscow, a nuclear Iran serves as a potential contender to keep the influence of Washington and its allies in check in the Middle East and Central Asia, potentially severing any and all hopes of engagement with the West.
This plays very well in Moscow’s strategic playbook for both areas, as it aims to elevate Tehran from being a mere regional stakeholder to a potential regional power, shattering any hope of normalizing its relations with the West. The bigger question is, will Moscow share its nuclear technology and expertise with Tehran? Only time will tell.
Thoughtful strategy or strategic gamble?
As Tehran has all the cards necessary to deepen its strategic partnership with Moscow in play, the logic over the West’s intent to curtail Iran from making such a deal appears more straightforward. For the reformist Pezeshkian, it is a meaningful opportunity not just to strengthen Iran’s defensive capabilities but also to achieve the aim of becoming a nuclear power, retaining and expanding influence in the Middle East while posing a serious challenge to Israel. This would be at the cost of his ambition of engaging with the West but the true challenge to those aims may well come from the IRGC and their hardline supporters who are willing to play the gamble and contemplate all available options to regain Iran’s regional influence.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the authors’ and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.
You can also highlight the text and press Ctrl + Enter
